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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
HAVEN M. WHITEAR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BROWN & ROOT, INC. and 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE 
COMPANY and the EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
Brief of Petitioner Haven M. Whitear 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-1-30(2)(b), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-
303(6), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (7), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8) (a), and Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues presented in this appeal and standards of review 
(1) Did the respondents waive any entitlement they may have had for the Labor 
Commission to hold the hearing on February 7, 1996? (R. 1407-1408, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the abuse of discretion standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
Case No. 980037-CA 
Priority No. 7 
(2) Was the February 7, 1987 industrial accident a factor in causing Mr. 
Whitear's depression? (R. 1408-1411, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue is 
the abuse of discretion substantial evidence standard. Grace Drilling Company v. 
Board of Review, 11Q P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
(3) Did the administrative law judge abuse his discretion when he dismissed Mr. 
Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the correction of error standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 11§ 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
(4) Did the administrative law judge fail to comply wi th the Industrial 
Commission's order of remand, and his own prehearing ruling, when he resolved 
issues other than the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression? (R. 1408-1411, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue is 
the correction of error standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 11Q 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
(5) Did the administrative law judge abuse his discretion when he ruled that Mr. 
Whitear's testimony lacked credibility? (R. 1413-1414,1640-1641) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the substantial evidence standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
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(6) Did the administrative law judge violate the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedures Act by not making any findings of fact and conclusions of law but 
instructing the respondents' counsel to prepare such findings and conclusions? (R. 
1415-1416, 1641) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1 997) 
(7) Did the Industrial Commission violate the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedures Act by denying Mr. Whitear a hearing on his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997) 
(8) Did the Industrial Commission violate Article I, §11 of the Constitution of 
Utah by denying Mr. Whitear the right to a hearing on his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640) 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997) 
(9) Did the Industrial Commission violate Article I, §7 of the Constitution of 
Utah by denying Mr. Whitear the right to a hearing on his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640) 
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Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue 
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional provisions in resolving this 
case are set forth in full in the Addendum to this Brief. Those Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
69, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, Utah Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-8, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-10, Article I, §7 of the Constitution of Utah, 
and Article I, §11 of the Constitution of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This is a workers compensation claim by petitioner Haven M. Whitear 
(hereinafter "Mr. Whitear") for permanent total disability benefits provided by the 
Workers Compensation Act of Utah. (R. 522) 
Course of proceedings 
On August 7, 1987 Judge Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 26-27) That Order was entered 
after the respondents notified Judge Allen that "they were accepting liability for an 
industrial accident . . . when the applicant was drenched with fyrquel 220, which 
leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose." The respondents also agreed "to pay all 
outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant." Judge Allen's 
August 7, 1987 Order expressly served as a protection of rights for Mr. Whitear and 
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reserved jurisdiction over this claim if any further dispute developed between the 
parties. (R. 26) 
On February 16, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed a second Application for Hearing, 
claiming to be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and also asserting that 
the respondents had failed to pay medical bills. (R. 453) The respondents in their 
answer to said Application for Hearing denied any liability. (R. 463-465) On 
September 7, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed an amended Application for Hearing asserting 
the additional claim of permanent total disability. (R. 522-523) The respondents in 
their answer to said amended Application for Hearing merely denied the claim for 
permanent total disability benefits and moved to join the Employers Reinsurance Fund. 
(R. 530) The respondents did not raise any affirmative defenses in their amended 
answer nor did they incorporate their prior answer into their amended answer. (R. 
530) 
A hearing was held on February 22, 1994. Following that hearing, Judge Allen 
entered his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the claim to a medical panel. (R. 
930-933) The respondents did not object to the case being referred to a medical 
panel. The Medical Panel issued its report on or about May 25, 1994. (R. 938-945) 
Mr. Whitear filed an objection to the medical panel report. That objection was based 
upon the fact that the Medical Panel did not attribute any of his depression to the 
February 17, 1987 industrial accident. (R. 961) The respondents did not file a timely 
objection to the medical panel report. 
Page 8 
On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear, the only party objecting to the medical panel 
report, withdrew his request for hearing on his objection to the medical panel's report 
without waiving his specific objection. (R. 967-968) Mr. Whitear not only withdrew 
his request for a hearing, he also requested that Judge Allen enter an appropriate 
Order based upon the medical evidence before him. (R. 968) Once again the 
respondents did not object. In fact, the respondents did not respond at all to Mr. 
Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his objection to the medical panel 
report nor did they respond to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge Allen enter an 
appropriate Order. 
On April 20, 1995, thirty-five days after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for 
hearing and requested the entry of an appropriate order, Judge Allen entered his 
Interim Order referring the applicant to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for 
evaluation pursuant to §35-1-67. (R. 970-972) On May 9, 1995, 350 days after the 
Medical Panel report, 54 days after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for a hearing and 
20 days after the date of the Interim Order was entered, the respondents finally filed 
a vague Motion for Review. (R. 974-977) The Industrial Commission issued an Order 
of Remand on July 31 , 1995 instructing the administrative law judge "to conduct a 
hearing on the medical panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr. 
Whitear's depression. The ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and 
appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and extent of Mr. Whitear's 
depression and related disability." (R. 983-986) A hearing was scheduled on February 
7, 1996. Prior to that hearing Mr. Whitear's counsel requested that Judge George 
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consider hearing evidence on the issue of Mr. Whitear's vocational rehabilitation. (R. 
1000-1001) The respondents' counsel objected to this request. (R. 996-999 ) Judge 
George on December 29, 1996 notified all counsel that the February 7, 1996 hearing 
would be limited to resolving the issue of determining the causation of Mr. Whitear's 
depression. (R. 1002) Following the hearing, Judge George stated that the 
respondents were liable to pay all reasonable medical expenses related to the 
treatment for asthma. In fact, Mr. Poelman, the defendant's counsel, did not have any 
objections or questions when Judge George made his ruling requiring the respondents 
to pay all medical bills incurred by Mr. Whitear for the treatment of his asthma. (R. 
1324) 
Judge George entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
the 26th day of July 1996. (R. 1389-1400) The Labor Commission entered its Order 
on Motion for Review on December 19, 1997. (R. 1639-1645) 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Labor Commission of Utah entered its Order on Motion for Review on 
December 19, 1997. (R. 1639-1645) The Labor Commission of Utah essentially 
affirmed Judge George's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 1639-
1645) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Whitear sustained an injury arising out of and during the course of his 
employment with Brown & Root on February 17, 1987. (R. 26-27) 
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2. On August 7, 1987 Judge Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. That Order was entered after 
the respondents notified Judge Allen that "they were accepting liability for an 
industrial accident . . . when the applicant was drenched with fyrquel 220, which 
leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose/' The respondents further agreed "to pay all 
outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant/' Judge Allen's 
August 7, 1987 Order expressly served as a protection of rights for Mr. Whitear and 
reserved jurisdiction over this claim if any further dispute developed between the 
parties. (R. 26-27) 
3. Mr. Whitear filed a second Application for Hearing, dated February 15, 
1993, claiming to be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and asserting that 
the respondents failed to pay medical expenses as ordered by Judge Allen.1 (R. 453) 
4. The respondents in their answer to said Application for Hearing denied any 
liability. (R. 463-465) 
5. On September 7, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed an amended Application for 
Hearing asserting the additional claim of permanent total disability. (R. 522-523) 
6. The respondents in their answer to said amended Application for Hearing 
merely denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits and moved to join the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund. The respondents did not raise any affirmative defenses 
in their amended answer nor did they incorporate their prior answer into their amended 
answer. (R. 530) 
1On June 6, 1998 Mr. Whitear was forced to file another Application for Hearing because the 
respondents continue to refuse to pay for his medical expenses. 
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7. The respondents, through their adjusters at Black, Nichols & Guiver, began 
to deny liability for the payment of medical expenses in October 1990. 
8. Mr. Whitear filed his responses to Interrogatories in June of 1 990 and again 
in June of 1993. In both responses Mr. Whitear identified unpaid medical expenses. 
(R. 503-518) 
9. A hearing was finally held on February 22, 1994. After that hearing, Judge 
Allen entered his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the claim to a medical 
panel. (R. 930-933) 
10. The respondents did not object to this claim being referred to a medical 
panel. 
11. The Medical Panel issued its report on or about May 25, 1994. (R. 938-
945) 
12. Mr. Whitear, after being granted an extension of time by Judge Allen to 
file an objection to the medical panel report, did file an objection to the medical panel 
report. The objection was based upon the fact that the Medical Panel did not attribute 
any of Mr. Whitear's depression to the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. (R. 961) 
13. The respondents did not file a timely objection to the medical panel report. 
14. Mr. Whitear's objection to the medical panel report was scheduled for 
hearing on March 8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. Mr. Whitear appeared along with his three 
witnesses, including Dr. Cali. The respondents failed to appear at the hearing. The 
hearing was canceled because of Mr. Poelman's alleged health problems. However, 
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neither Mr. Whitear nor his counsel were notified that the hearing had been canceled. 
(R. 967-968) 
15. On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear, the only party objecting to the medical 
panel report, wi thdrew his request for hearing on his objection to the medical panel's 
report without waiving his specific objection. (R. 967-968) 
16. Mr. Whitear not only withdrew his request for a hearing, he also requested 
that Judge Allen enter appropriate Order based upon the medical evidence before him. 
(R. 968) 
17. Once again the respondents did not object. In fact, the respondents did 
not respond to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his objection 
to the medical panel report nor did they respond to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge 
Allen enter an appropriate Order. 
18. On April 20, 1995, thirty five days after Mr. Whitear wi thdrew his request 
for hearing and requested the entry of an appropriate order, Judge Allen entered his 
Interim Order referring Mr. Whitear to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for 
evaluation pursuant to §35-1-67. (R. 970-972) 
19. On May 9, 1995, 350 days after the medical panel report, 54 days after 
Mr. Whitear wi thdrew his request for a hearing and 20 days after the date of the 
Interim Order, the respondents filed a vague Motion for Review. (R. 974-977) 
20. As a result of that Motion for Review the Industrial Commission issued an 
Order of Remand on July 3 1 , 1995 instructing the ALJ "to conduct a hearing on the 
medical panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr. Whitear's depression. 
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The ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and appropriate to fully develop 
the record regarding the cause and extent of Mr. Whitear's depression and related 
disability." (R. 983-986) 
21 . Prior to the February 7, 1996 hearing, Mr. Whitear's counsel requested 
that Judge George consider hearing evidence on the issue of Mr. Whitear's vocational 
rehabilitation. (R. 1000-1001) 
22. The respondents' counsel objected to Mr. Whitear's request. On 
December 29, 1995 Judge George notified counsel that the February 7, 1996 hearing 
would be limited to the issue of determining the causation of Mr. Whitear's 
depression. (R. 1002-1003) 
23. Dr. Burgoyne, a member of the Medical Panel testified at the February 7, 
1996 hearing. During his testimony Dr. Burgoyne admitted that the industrial accident 
was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. (R. 1043, 1054) 
24. The respondents failed to produce any evidence at the February 7, 1996 
hearing that they are not liable for the payment of medical expenses incurred by Mr. 
Whitear with respect to the treatment he has received for asthma. 
25. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge George stated that the 
respondents were liable to pay all reasonable medical expenses related to the 
treatment for asthma. Mr. Poelman, the defendant's counsel, did not question or 
object to Judge George's ruling that the respondents pay for all of Mr. Whitear's 
medical care and treatment related to Mr. Whitear's asthma. (R. 1324) 
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26. The only evidence presented to Judge George at the February 7, 1996 
hearing as to the cause of Mr. Whitear's disability was the uncontradicted testimony 
of Mr. Whitear with respect to asthma, the finding by social security that Mr. Whitear 
is disabled primarily due to the asthma (R. 57, 852-854) and the August 18, 1995 
report form the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation that Mr. Whitear is not a viable 
candidate for vocational rehabilitation. (R. 1510) 
27. All medical experts who submitted records and/or testimony in this claim 
agree that Mr. Whitear suffers from depression. The only doctor who did not attribute 
any causal connection of the depression to the industrial accident was the 
respondents' doctor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Once again this Court is the forum of last resort for an injured worker who, 
after sustaining an injury while working, has had the effects of the physical injuries 
compounded by the Labor Commission's actions. This is not a case of an injured 
worker asking this Court to award him anything to which he is not entitled under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
This case is about Mr. Whitear who was injured in an industrial accident on 
February 17, 1987 and his claim for permanent total disability benefits. The 
respondents are under order to pay Mr. Whitear for all medical expenses he incurs in 
the treatment of the injuries he sustained in the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear suffers from asthma, which was caused 
by the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. There is also no dispute that Mr. 
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Whitear has been found to be totally disabled by the Social Security Administration 
primarily due to the asthma from which he suffers. There is also no dispute that Mr. 
Whitear has been evaluated by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and found by 
that office not to be a viable candidate for vocational rehabilitation primarily due to the 
limitations of his asthma. 
Mr. Whitear presented his claim for permanent total disability benefits to the 
Labor Commission of Utah. Judge Allen, after reviewing all of the evidence, entered 
an Interim Order making a tentative finding that Mr. Whitear was indeed permanently 
and totally disabled, and referring this claim to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation 
for an evaluation. 
Before entering his Interim Order, Judge Allen had this claim reviewed by a 
medical panel. The medical panel issued a written report wherein it concluded that 
Mr. Whitear had a substantial whole person impairment due to the asthma. The 
respondents never objected to Judge Allen's referral of the claim to a medical panel. 
The respondents never filed a timely objection to the report issued by the medical 
panel. The respondents never filed a timely request for a hearing disputing any portion 
of the medical panel's report. 
Only Mr. Whitear filed an objection to a minor portion of the medical panel's 
report. There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear suffers from depression. The medical 
panel concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression, although significant, was not caused 
by the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. Mr. Whitear, based upon his doctor's 
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opinion challenged the medical panel's conclusion that the depression was not caused 
by the industrial accident. 
A hearing was scheduled by Judge Allen on Mr. Whitear's objection to the 
medical panel's report. Mr. Whitear and all of his witnesses appeared at the hearing 
only to learn it had been cancelled. Thereafter, Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for 
a hearing, without waiving his objections to the medical panel report and requested 
that Judge Allen enter an appropriate Order. Judge Allen entered such an Order and 
concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was caused by the February 17, 1987 
accident. Judge Allen reached this conclusion because the medical panel did not 
address the issue of causation and the respondents' doctor also failed to state the 
cause of Mr. Whitear's depression. 
The respondent did not object to Mr. Whitear withdrawing his request for a 
hearing. The respondents did not object to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge Allen 
enter an appropriate Order. 
It was not until May 9, 1995, 350 days after the medical panel report, 54 days 
after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for a hearing and 20 days after the date of the 
Interim Order, that the respondents finally responded by filing a vague Motion for 
Review. 
The Labor Commission granted the respondents' Motion for Review and 
remanded the case for further hearing. The hearing was limited to resolving the issue 
of what caused Mr. Whitear's depression. 
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On remand, the claim was assigned to Judge George. Judge George had no 
familiarity with this claim. Judge George took it upon himself to expressly limit the 
hearing, pursuant to the Order of Remand, to resolving the issue of causation. Judge 
George, and the Labor Commission, were under the mistaken impression that Mr. 
Whitear was totally disabled due to his depression. The records clearly demonstrate 
two points. First, Mr. Whitear is primarily totally disabled due to asthma. Second, Mr. 
Whitear never suffered from depression until after the February 17, 1987 industrial 
accident. 
Nonetheless, Judge George, after hearing overwhelming evidence in support 
of Mr. Whitear's claim that the depression was indeed caused by the industrial 
accident, and, after hearing the medical panel expert on depression concede that the 
industrial accident did contribute to Mr. Whitear's depression, Judge George still 
concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was not caused by the industrial accident. 
Judge George reached this conclusion even after receiving the testimonial concession 
by the medical panel's expert that the February 17, 1987 was indeed a factor in 
causing Mr. Whitear's depression. That testimony by the medical panel expert 
modified the panel's written report. 
After Judge George ignored the evidence, he augmented his error by dismissing 
Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Judge George concluded 
that Mr. Whitear was not totally disabled due to asthma. The only evidence before 
Judge George was contrary to this conclusion. 
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The Labor Commission and Judge George notified Mr. Whitear that a hearing 
would be held to determine what caused his depression. At the conclusion of that 
hearing, not only did Judge George make, and the Labor Commission affirmed, an 
insupportable ruling on the only issue which ostensibly was to be resolved, but Mr. 
Whitear's entire claim was dismissed. 
Mr. Whitear was never given a hearing on his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. Mr. Whitear has a right to such a hearing. That right is given to 
him by the Constitution of the State of Utah and by the Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
Our system of jurisprudence is controlled and regulated by laws and rules. 
Underlying all those laws and rules are fundamental principles of justice and fairness. 
Where is the fairness and the justice when a judge can limit a party to presenting 
evidence at a hearing on only one issue and then the judge, at the end of the hearing, 
enters an order resolving all the issues? That is what Judge George and the Labor 
Commission did to Mr. Whitear. Judge George and the Labor Commission reversed 
the tentative finding of permanent total disability made by Judge Allen without the 
benefit of any additional or new evidence. The only evidence before Judge George 
and the Labor Commission which was not available to Judge Allen was the admission 
by the medical panel expert on depression that Mr. Whitear's industrial accident was 
a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. Such an admission reaffirmed the 
appropriateness of Judge Allen's Order. Such an admission emphasizes the fallacy of 
Judge George's ruling and the Labor Commission's adoption of that ruling. 
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The Labor Commission and Judge George abused their discretion at nearly 
every turn in this case. They granted the respondents a hearing when the respondents 
failed to file a timely request for a hearing. The respondents waited nearly one year, 
350 days, before they made any objections or requests for hearing on the report 
issued by the medical panel. Had Mr. Whitear been so utterly lackadaisical in 
requesting a hearing, it is unlikely that he would have been granted such leeway by 
the Labor Commission. By ruling against Mr. Whitear, Judge George and the Labor 
Commission totally ignored the mountain of evidence which was presented in support 
of Mr. Whitear's claim. 
Judge George failed to make any findings of fact. Instead he delegated his 
legal obligation to counsel for the respondents to make appropriate findings of fact. 
The Labor Commission, instead of reprimanding a judge for shirking his duties, merely 
fell in lock step with the judge and affirmed what he did and how he did it. 
To remedy the injustice inflicted on Mr. Whitear by Judge George and the Labor 
Commission, this Court must reinstate the order entered by Judge Allen and then 





DID THE RESPONDENTS WAIVE ANY ENTITLEMENT THEY 
MAY HAVE HAD FOR THE LABOR COMMISSION TO HOLD 
THE HEARING ON FEBRUARY 7, 1996. 
The February 7, 1996 hearing should not have been held because the 
respondents waived any entitlement to such hearing. It was Mr. Whitear who had 
objected to the medical panel report. (R. 961) Specifically, Mr. Whitear objected that 
the medical panel failed to conclude that the February 17, 1987 industrial accident 
was the cause of his depression. Mr. Whitear requested and was granted a hearing 
on his objection. On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for hearing. 
(R. 967-968) The respondents failed to object to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his 
request for hearing. It was not until after Judge Allen entered his Interim Order on 
April 20, 1995 that the defendants finally objected. (R. 974-977) 
The Industrial Commission entered an Order of Remand on July 31 , 1995 
recognizing that the order was not based on any statutory or rule authorizing the 
remand. The question this Court must now answer is how a party who fails to object 
to a report of a medical panel, who fails to request a hearing, and who fails to object 
to the other party's withdrawal of a request for a hearing, is still entitled to a hearing 
on an issue involving the medical panel's report? 
The answer to that question must be that the party failing to object is NOT 
entitled to a hearing. The statutes and rules are full of time limitations within which 
certain action must be taken. Rule 568-1-5 of the Workers' Compensation Rules 
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provides for the computation of time limits. The day of the act shall not be included 
but the last day is unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal Holiday. The parties are 
given 15 days to object to the medical panel report. Failure to act within the 
prescribed time limits bars further action. The party who fails to act within the 
prescribed time limits has in essence waived any right to object. 
In this case, the respondents never objected to the medical panel report. The 
respondents did not request a hearing on Mr. Whitear's objections to the medical panel 
for 350 days after the date the medical panel report was issued. The respondents did 
not request or obtain an extension of time to seek a hearing on the objections to the 
medical panel report. 
It is submitted that if Mr. Whitear had waited 350 days to file his objections to 
the report of the medical panel, his claim for hearing would have been denied by the 
Labor Commission. So why can an employer and an insurance carrier obtain a hearing 
when they waited so long to request the hearing? 
Under these circumstances, this Court can only conclude that the respondents 
waived any right to a hearing they may have had on objecting to the report of the 
medical panel. That based upon that waiver, this Court must also rule that the Labor 
Commission abused its discretion in allowing the respondents to have their hearing. 
This abuse of discretion substantially prejudiced Mr. Whitear. Willardson v. Industrial 
Commission, 904 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1995) 
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Point II 
THE FEBRUARY 7, 1987 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT WAS A 
FACTOR IN CAUSING MR. WHITEAR'S DEPRESSION. 
This claim was remanded to the Administrative Law Judge by the Labor 
Commission for the purpose of determining the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression. (R. 
983-986) Mr. Whitear objected to a hearing being held in this matter after the 
respondents had failed to file a timely objection to the report of the medical panel and 
had failed to object to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his 
objection to the medical panel report. (R. 1016-1020) 
In its July 31,1995 Order of Remand the Labor Commission acknowledges that 
its interference in claims in which a final order had not been entered, could disrupt the 
adjudicatory process. (R. 983-986) Yet that is exactly what the Labor Commission 
did by entering its Order of Remand. It interrupted the process and gave the 
respondents a reprieve from their failure to file timely objections to the report of the 
medical panel. 
The Labor Commission's interruption of the judicial process culminated in the 
hearing scheduled before Judge George on February 7, 1996. Instead of Mr. Whitear 
being evaluated for vocational rehabilitation, Judge George determined that a hearing 
was necessary, because the respondents had requested it, to resolve the issue of 
what caused Mr. Whitear's depression. Judge George expressly limited the hearing 
to the resolution of that one issue. (R. 1002-1003) But the interruption and 
corruption of the judicial process continued when Judge George dismissed Mr. 
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Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the conclusion of the 
February 7, 1996 hearing. 
Since the issue to be resolved at the hearing was the cause of Mr. Whitear's 
depression, the only real credible medical evidence presented was the testimony of Dr. 
Burgoyne, the medical panel expert, although Dr. Cali and Dr. McCann also testified 
on the issue. Their testimony was actually irrelevant since their disagreement on the 
issue is what resulted in the matter being referred to the medical panel by Judge Allen. 
Dr. Burgoyne, the psychiatrist and expert on depression for the medical panel, 
testified that the industrial accident was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. 
The following exchange took place between Mr. Whitear's counsel and Dr. Burgoyne: 
"Q. [by counsel to Dr. Burgoyne] Your statement that the 
ongoing legal dispute between Mr. Whitear and his former 
employer, the insurance company, is a factor in his 
depression; it that right? 
A. It's a factor. 
Q. Okay, So if that is a factor, then is it not true to say 
that the accident then in some way is also a factor in 
causing his depression? 
A. I would have to say yes, but -- well there are many 
things in life. Yes." (R. 1054) 
Dr. Burgoyne further testified as follows: 
"Q [by counsel to Dr. Burgoyne] Dr. Burgoyne, will you 
concede that an individual who suffers an injury on the job, 
besides the physical injury, that may also cause depression? 
A. Injury on the job could cause depression, yes. 
Q. However, in this case you concluded it didn't? 
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A. I concluded it wasn't a very big factor." 
(R. 1043) 
Through his testimony Dr. Burgoyne contradicted and clarified the medical 
panel's written report in which the panel concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was 
not caused by the industrial accident. This clarification should have been sufficient 
for Judge George to rule that Mr. Whitear's depression was caused, at least in part, 
by the industrial accident. 
Mr. Whitear presented additional evidence that his depression was caused by 
the industrial accident. 
Craig Whitear testified to Mr. Whitear's ability to work and how his behavior 
changed dramatically after the industrial accident. Craig Whitear testified that Mr. 
Whitear liked school, did not have a conflict with his step-mother and that Mr. Whitear 
grieved as any normal person does when losing his mother. Craig Whitear further 
testified that after the industrial accident Mr. Whitear became withdrawn and 
reclusive. (R. 1196-1211) 
The testimony of Craig Whitear was supported by the testimony of Brent 
Bohman. Mr. Bohman testified that he personally noticed a striking change in the 
behavior of Mr. Whitear from before accident to after accident. (R. 1214-1223) 
Jeff O'Driscoll also testified about the changes he observed in Mr. Whitear's 
behavior after the industrial accident. (R. 1185-1187) 
The respondents did not present any evidence to contradict the testimony of 
Craig Whitear, Brent Bohman and Jeff O'Driscoll. 
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The only evidence that the respondents presented on the issue of the cause of 
Mr. Whitear's depression was the testimony of Dr. McCann. That doctor even 
contradicted himself when he testified that he "cannot identify specific - a single, 
specific cause for his depression/" (R. 1304) 
The respondents did not present any credible evidence that Mr. Whitear was 
depressed before the industrial accident. In fact, the only evidence presented was the 
testimony of the people who knew Mr. Whitear before and after the accident. Not one 
of them testified about Mr. Whitear being depressed before the accident. 
The medical panel clarified its written report when Dr. Burgoyne testified that 
the industrial accident was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. Thus, for 
Judge George to conclude that the depression was not caused, at least in part, by the 
industrial accident was an arbitrary and capricious ruling which is not supported by 
any credible, relevant and substantial evidence as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
Judge George's failure to consider the substantial evidence presented in 
support of Mr. Whitear and in light of the medical panel expert clarified that panel's 
written report by testifying that the industrial accident did contribute to Mr. Whitear's 
depression, is an abuse of discretion. That abuse was compounded by the Labor 
Commission affirming Judge George's ruling. That abuse of discretion had the 
ultimate prejudicial result. The dismissal of Mr. Whitear's claim. 
Page 26 
Point III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HIS 
DISCRETION WHEN HE DISMISSED MR. WHITEAR'S 
CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
Given the very narrow and limited issue to be resolved at the February 7, 1996 
hearing, it was a clear abuse of discretion to dismiss Mr. Whitear's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits. 
The Labor Commission in its July 31 , 1995 Order of Remand instructed Judge 
George to "conduct a hearing on the medical panel's report, particularly regarding the 
cause of Mr. Whitear's depression. The ALJ may take such other action as is 
necessary and appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and extent 
of Mr. Whitear's depression and related disability." (R. 983-986) 
Judge George on December 29, 1995 instructed counsel that the issue to be 
resolved at the February 7, 1996 hearing was the "causal connection" between the 
industrial accident and Mr. Whitear's depression. There would not be any evidence 
presented or considered concerning vocational rehabilitation. (R. 1002-1003) 
In spite of Judge George's effort to limit the hearing issue, he did receive 
evidence about Mr. Whitear's inability to work. First, Judge George received evidence 
that the Social Security Administration had found Mr. Whitear to be totally disabled 
primarily due to his asthma. (R. 944) Second, Judge George received a report from the 
Utah State Office of Rehabilitation which indicates that due to Mr. Whitear's "severe 
respiratory condition, including asthma and shortness of breath" he probably would 
not benefit from rehabilitation services. (R. 1510-1511) 
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There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear's asthma and respiratory problems are 
caused by the industrial accident. (R. 944) 
Neither the Social Security Administration nor the Office of Rehabilitation 
considered the primary reason for their respective decisions to be Mr. Whitear's 
depression. Those agencies considered Mr. Whitear's asthma the primary reason for 
his disability and their inability to offer any vocational rehabilitation services. 
Incredibly, Judge George signed, and the Labor Commission approved, an order which 
concludes that Mr. Whitear is receiving social security benefits due to his depression. 
(R. 1393) 
Judge George limited the February 7, 1996 hearing issue to the cause of Mr. 
Whitear's depression. Judge George did not take evidence on Mr. Whitear's asthma 
which was caused by the industrial accident and for which the medical panel 
attributed a 10% whole person impairment, a significant impairment rating. (R. 944) 
Judge George received no evidence as to Mr. Whitear's inability to work, other than 
the report from the Office of Rehabilitation, the Social Security Administration's 
conclusion and some testimony from the lay witnesses. Nonetheless, Judge George 
signed an order which concludes that Mr. Whitear is not totally disabled due to his 
asthma. (R. 1395) 
By limiting the issue for the February 7, 1996 hearing, and then entering 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order resolving the entire claim filed by Mr. 
Whitear is contrary to the Labor Commission's Order of Remand and is so arbitrary 
and capricious it smacks of prejudice. 
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Point IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE LABOR COMMISSION'S ORDER OF REMAND 
AND HIS OWN PREHEARING RULING. 
Mr. Whitear is alleging that Judge George acted arbitrary and capricious when 
he dismissed Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the end of 
the February 7, 1996 hearing. The best evidence supporting this argument is the 
Labor Commission's Order of Remand (R. 583-586) and Judge George's December 
29, 1995 ruling. (R. 1002-1003) Both limit the February 7, 1996 hearing to one 
narrow and specific issue. That issue was the causation of Mr. Whitear's depression. 
Yet Judge George, at the end of that hearing, entered an Order which reached far 
beyond resolving that very narrow issue. Judge George's Order wiped out Mr. 
Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits. (R. 1398) There is no 
justification or explanation for such an arbitrary and capricious act. The judge's ruling 
is the judicial equivalent of the "bait and switch" sales method. The Labor 
Commission, in failing to correct the error made by the judge, is even more culpable 
than the judge. The Labor Commission should protect injured workers from judicial 
abuse by a judge. The Labor Commission should not become an accomplice to such 
abuse. In this case, the Labor Commission chose to support an abuse of discretion. 
Thus, it falls upon this Court to provide the appropriate relief. 
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Point V 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HIS 
DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT MR. WHITEAR 
LACKED CREDIBILITY. 
Judge George entered Findings of Fact to support his conclusion that Mr. 
Whitear lacked credibility.2 (R. 1393-1395) Some of these Findings were based upon 
Judge George's idiosyncratic notions about perfumes, bathroom disinfectants and Mr. 
Whitear's sex life. (R. 1393-1395, 1319-1320) 
There was no evidence presented that any person in the courtroom during the 
hearing was wearing any perfumes or colognes. Nor was there any evidence 
presented at the hearing about the "alleged'' disinfectants used in the restroom near 
the courtroom. This Court can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that there 
are walls and doors which separate the courtrooms from the restroom, and that the 
odors from one room cannot be detected in the other room. 
Judge George did conclude that Mr. Whitear's sex life had not been adversely 
affected by the accident and his depression. This conclusion was based upon the fact 
that Mr. Whitear did become a father after the industrial accident. In fact, Judge 
George stated that Mr. Whitear had sexual relations at least two times after the 1987 
accident. (R. 1319-1320) 
2 l t should be noted that Judge George only made two findings of fact on his own. One relating to Mr. 
Whitear's sex life and the other relating to his testimony that he became reclusive. (R. 1309-1321) The 
first is totally irrelevant to any issue in this claim and the second demonstrates a complete failure on the 
part of ALJ to listen to the testimony. Finally, it must be noted that the Findings signed by the ALJ are not 
his findings but are the findings of Mr. Poelman, defendants' counsel. 
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Judge George continued to dismiss Mr. Whitear's testimony by remarking on 
Mr. Whitear's habit of smoking. The fact that Mr. Whitear smoked and made attempts 
to quit smoking does not demonstrate a lack of credibility. Smoking is not and was 
not the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression or asthma. The medical panel did not find 
or attribute any physical impairment or injury to Mr. Whitear's smoking. It did 
attribute the significant impairment to Mr. Whitear's asthma which was caused by the 
industrial accident. (R. 944) 
Dr. McCann did initially express concerns about Mr. Whitear "faking" on some 
tests. However, after hearing the testimony from Mr. Whitear's friends and brother, 
Dr. McCann testified that he was touched by the support Mr. Whitear has received 
from his friends and family. In fact, after hearing the testimony of the lay witnesses, 
Dr. McCann was impressed how socially isolated Mr. Whitear had become. Judge 
George, however, found that the testimony of the witnesses who stated that Mr. 
Whitear had become isolated, "runs counter" to Mr. Whitear's testimony that he has 
become withdrawn. (R. 1321) Every witness agreed that Mr. Whitear has become 
withdrawn. Dr. McCann, the respondents' expert, realized that Mr. Whitear had 
become socially withdrawn. Only Judge George and the Labor Commission failed, or 
refused, to understand how much Mr. Whitear has withdrawn from his friends and 
family since the industrial accident. Presented with such overwhelming testimony, 
Judge George remarkably concluded Mr. Whitear has not socially withdrawn. (R. 
1321) 
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Dr. McCann, the witness whose testimony was most hostile toward Mr. 
Whitear, testified that he realized Mr. Whitear has a real problem with depression and 
that he felt very sympathetic toward him. (R. 1304) 
Judge George stretched his enmity toward Mr. Whitear when he found that 
there is an implication that Mr. Whitear may be using this system for some kind of 
gain when he concludes that "[Mr. Whitear] is wise to the workers compensation 
system." (R. 1395) That Finding is totally unsupported by any evidence. It is another 
example of counsel for the respondents making a finding of the judge. 
Considering how very little Mr. Whitear has gained financially and the hardship 
Mr. Whitear has had to endure since the industrial accident, it would be fair to ask just 
how wise is Mr. Whitear really? How much gain has Mr. Whitear's "use" of the 
system brought him? 
The Findings concerning Mr. Whitear's alleged lack of credibility were drafted 
by Mr. Poelman, without any guidance from Judge George. These Findings were 
included, in an unethical attempt, to make it nearly impossible for Mr. Whitear to 
challenge the findings on appeal. Those findings are in actuality the argument of 
counsel and are unsupported by any evidence. There is not a scintilla of evidence to 
support such findings and thus they must be reversed. Clearly, if Mr. Whitear had 
credibility, then Judge George's ruling would have been in favor of the claim. Instead 
the unsupported findings concerning Mr. Whitear's lack of credibility have contributed 




JUDGE GEORGE VIOLATED THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES ACT BY NOT MAKING ANY FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BUT INSTRUCTING 
MR. POELMAN TO PREPARE THEM FOR HIM. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-10 (1988, as amended) 
provides as follows: 
"In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing . . . the 
presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact 
based exclusively on the evidence of record in the 
adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of 
law) 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's 
decision." [Emphasis added] 
In this case, Judge George did not satisfy or comply with any of the above 
cited provisions of §63-46b-10. Other than making the two findings of fact at the 
conclusion of the hearing, on February 7, 1996, Judge George sent a FAX to Mr. 
Poelman containing the following instructions: 
"Mr. Poelman-Although I recited some specifics in my 
decision this evening, that was not all-inclusive. You may 
utilize all the support evidenced in your defense that you 
feel is appropriate. If I feel that something more or less is 
necessary, I'll ask for a disk so I can modify it. Thank 
you.***DLG" (R. 1363) 
In other words, Judge George delegated his statutory obligation to the defense 
attorney. It may be appropriate for a judge to make specific findings and conclusions 
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as required by law and then direct counsel to draft the order in accordance therewith. 
It is totally inappropriate for a judge to allow defense counsel to make any findings 
and conclusions that counsel deems appropriate. 
This Court must reject the Findings and Conclusions signed by Judge George 
on July 26, 1996 since they are not his Findings and Conclusions as required by law. 
The fact that the Labor Commission adopted those Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law does not remedy the underlying problem. 
Point VII 
MR. WHITEAR HAS BEEN DENIED A HEARING ON HIS 
CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
The Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8, provides in 
part, 
"that in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall 
be conducted." 
Such a hearing shall provide all parties a reasonable opportunity to present their 
positions. 
Article 1, §7 of the Constitution of Utah provides that 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law/ ' 
Article 1, §11 of the Constitution of Utah provides that 
"all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party." 
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Judge George and the Labor Commission have denied Mr. Whitear the hearing 
to which he is entitled pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. More 
importantly, Judge George and the Labor Commission have deprived Mr. Whitear of 
his right to due process and closed the door the Constitution guarantees will be open. 
This was done to Mr. Whitear when he was informed that the February 7, 1996 
hearing would only address the issue of establishing the causation of his depression. 
The hearing was expressly limited to the resolution of that issue by Judge George and 
the Labor Commission's July 31 , 1995 Order of Remand. At the end of that hearing, 
not only did Judge George rule in opposition to the evidence presented on the issue 
of causation, but also dismissed Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. 
The Labor Commission has never granted Mr. Whitear a hearing on the issue 
of whether he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits based upon the fact that 
he suffers from asthma. Asthma which was caused by the February 17, 1987 
industrial accident. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah and the Administrative Procedures Act 
entitled Mr. Whitear to a hearing. 
Page 35 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Whitear respectfully prays that this Court set aside the December 19, 1997 
Order on Motion for Review, reinstate the April 20, 1995 Interim Order entered by 
Judge Allen and remand this case to the Labor Commission for further proceeding 
consistent with Judge Allen's April 20, 1995 Interim Order. 
Dated this 14th day of May 1998. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May 1998 I delivered two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Mr. Whitear to the following: 
Alan L. Hennebold 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Labor Commission 
Stuart L. Poelman 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Brown & Root and 
Highlands Insurance 
Erie V. Boorman 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
Dated this 14th day of 
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ADDENDUM 1: Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any 
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time 
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings 
or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the 
order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay 
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing 
interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings: 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the 
issues presented: or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-10. enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, $ 266; 1988, ch . 72, § 20. 
Tab 2 
ADDENDUM 2: Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious: 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv> may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g.» The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(hi Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential 
information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
History: C. 1953. 63-46b-8, enacted by L. Privileges. Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq. 
1987, ch. 161, * 264: 1988, ch. 72, * 19. " 
Cross-References. — Judicial notice. Utah 
R. Evid. 201. 
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ADDENDUM 3: Constitution of Utah, Artie I 
Sec, 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
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ADDENDUM 4: Constitution of Utah, Article 1 , §7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
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ADDENDUM 5: \ugust 7, 1987 Order 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 87000446 
HAVEN WHITEAR * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BROWN & ROOT, INC. and/or * AND ORDER 
HIGHLAND INSURANCE * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 6, 
1987 at 2:30 p.m. ofclock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by David 
Bert Havas, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the time and place set for the evidentiary hearing, the 
defendants, by and through counsel, notified the Administrative Law Judge that 
they were accepting liability for an industrial accident sustained by the 
applicant on March 10, 1987. On March 10, 1987, the applicant was drenched 
with fyrquel 220, which leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose. The defendants 
have accepted liability for that industrial accident and have also agreed to 
pay all outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant. It 
was also discussed by the parties that at the present time the file contains 
insufficient evidence to support the applicant's claim of temporary total 
compensation or possible permanent partial impairment as the result of the 
industrial accident. The parties have agreed that they will consult and agree 
upon a mutually acceptable physician to examine the applicant further. In the 
event dispute develops, then such further proceedings will be had by the 





I I 1G THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of H*u/eu Whit ear x.* hereby 
dismissed at this time, pending further medical evaluation, which shall be 
paid for by the defendant. The application for hearing shall serve as a 
protection of rights, and in the event dispute develops such further 
proceedings as are necessary will be convened by the Commission. 
II IS FURTHER ORDERED that *JULIJ Motion lor Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Timothy C^fillen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
yt%* day of August, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
Lind'a J. Straatafrg 
Commission ^e^retary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August / . 1987 a copy of the 
of Joe Ramirez issued August ^7 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 




Morgan, Utah 84050 
David B. Havas 
Attorney at Lav 
2604 Madison Ave 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Highlands Insurance 
c/o Black, Nichols & Guiver 
P.O. Box 2615 
Salt Lake City,. Utah 84110 
Henry K. Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 




ADDENDUM 6- April 20 , 1995 Interim Order 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-229 
* 
HAVEN WHITEAR, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
VS. * INTERIM ORDER 
BROWN & ROOT, INC. and/or * 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE, EMPLOYERS * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
.Defendants, * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room- 334, Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on February 22, 1994, at 10:00 o'clock 
a. m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented 
by Hans Scheffler, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Stuart 
Poelman, Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented 
by Erie Boorman, Attorney. 
Following the hearing in this matter, the Presiding Law Judge 
referred the_ file to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The 
Medical Panei Report was forwarded to the parties by certified 
mail. The applicant, by and through counsel, filed Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report for the failure of the Panel to attribute 
any of the psychiatric impairment to the industrial accident of 
February 17, 1987. Thereafter, the matter was scheduled for a 
hearing on the applicants Objections. On March 21, 1995 the 
applicant, by and through counsel, withdrew his request for a 
hearing on the Objections to the Panel Report, noting that the 
medical evidence on the file did not sustain the Panel's finding of 
pre-existing psychiatric impairment. 
After reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the other medical 




applicant is well founded/ As I review the psychiatric portion of 
the Panel Report, I can find no evidence to support: -cne Panels—" 
finding that the applicant had pre-exisring p^ ychia-cric impaimteiTT:—-
ThSieluie, I adopt the panel's finding that rne applicant nas a b % — 
permanent impairment due to depression, however, I take exception 
to the Panel's finding that none of that impairment is due to the 
industrial accident. Rather, I adopt the finding of Dr. Cali that 
the applicant's depression is a.result of the industrial accident 
of February 17, 1987. Accordingly, the applicant shall be entitled 
to treatment for his depression on an industrial basis. 
The applicant has also requested a tentative finding of 
permanent total disability. After reviewing the file, it appears 
the applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability based on the findings of .the Panel as amended, • and in 
view of the finding of disability since December 29, 1989 made by 
Social Security. Accordingly, the applicant shall be referred to 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services for their evaluation as 
required by Section 67 of the Workers Compensation Act. 
INTERIM ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections of the applicant 
to the Medical Panel Report should be and the same are hereby 
granted. Accordingly, the defendants shall pay all medical 
expenses incurred as the result of the industrial injury, including 
but not limited to treatment for depression, in accordance with the 
medical and surgical fee schedule of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant is tentatively 
permanently and totally disabled as the result of the industrial 
accident of February 17, 1987, and is hereby referred to the 
Division of Rehabilitation Services for its evaluation pursuant to 
S35-1-67• 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1995. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April 20, 1995, a copy of the ..attached 
Interim Order in the case of Haven Whitear was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Haven Whitear 
Rt.2, Box 131 
Morgan, UT 84050 
Hans Scheffler, Esq. 
311 South State, #180 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Stuart Poelman, Esq. 
77 W. 200 S., #400 
SLC, UT 84101 
Erie Boorman, Esq. 
ERF 
P.O. 146611 
SLC, UT 84114-6611 
Black, Nichols & Guiver 
P.O. 2615 
SLC, UT 84110-2615 




ADDENDUM 7: July 3 1 , 1995 Order of Remand 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HAVEN WEITEAR, * 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER OF REMAND 
BROWN AND ROOT, INC., HIGHLAND * 
INSURANCE COMPANY and THE * 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, * Case No, 93-0229 
* 
Defendants. * 
Brown and Root, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurano 
carrier, Highland Insurance Company, (referred to jointly as "Brow 
and Root" hereafter) ask The Industrial Commission of Utah t< 
review the Administrative Law Judge's interim order regarding Have: 
Whitear's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensatic: 
Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over thi-
Motion for Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Cod 
Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Whitear has filed a claim for permanent total disabilit 
compensation alleging he is unable to work as a result of a 
industrial injury suffered on February 17, 1987, while employed b 
Brown & Root. 
After an initial hearing, the ALJ referred the medical aspect 
of Mr. Whitear's claim to a medical panel with instructions t 
answer the following questions: 
1. What is the permanent impairment due to the industria 
accident of February 17, 1987; 
2. Is the applicant's depression a result of the industria 
accident of February 17, 1987; 
3. Does the applicant have asthma as a result of th 
industrial accident; 
4. What is the permanent impairment due to pre-existin 
conditions. 
ORDER OF REMAND 
HAVEN WHITEAR 
PAGE TWO 
On May 25, 1994, the medical panel reported to the ALJ that 
Mr. Whitear suffered a 10% impairment from a pulmonary disorder 
that was entirely due to his industrial accident. The medical 
panel further reported that Mr. Whitear suffered a 5% impairment 
from depression. As to the cause of such depression, the medical 
panel stated: 
There does not appear to be a direct causal relationship 
between the exposure (to toxic substances at Brown & 
Root) and his psychiatric status, which is interpreted as 
being equally due to pre-existing and subsequent factors. 
Mr. Whitear objected to the medical panel's conclusion 
regarding the causes of his depression and the ALJ scheduled a 
hearing on such objections. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Whitear 
withdrew his request for hearing and argued instead that the 
medical panel's report failed to identify any preexisting cause of 
Mr. Whitear's depression. 
Based upon Mr. Whitear's arguments, the ALJ canceled the 
hearing that had been scheduled to address the medical panel's 
report. Then, the ALJ rejected the medical panel's finding that 
Mr. Whitear's depression was due to preexisting and subsequent 
factors other than his industrial accident at Brown & Root. 
Instead, the ALJ adopted the opinion of Dr. Cali, Mr. Whitear's 
treating psychologist, that a causal connection existed between the 
industrial accident and depression. The ALJ then issued an interim 
order holding Mr. Whitear permanently and totally disabled and 
referring him to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for 
determination of his potential for rehabilitation. 
DISCUSSION 
Brown & Root asks the Industrial Commission to intervene in 
this matter, despite the fact that the ALJ has not yet issued his 
final decision on Mr. Whitear's claim. While the Industrial 
Commission is unaware of any statutory limit to its jurisdiction 
over cases pending before its Administrative Law Judges, the 
Industrial Commission also recognizes that its interference could 
potentially disrupt the adjudicatory process. Therefore, the 
Industrial Commission will exercise jurisdiction over cases pending 
before an ALJ only in certain unusual cases, this being one. 
ORDER OF REMAND 
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With respect to Mr. Whitear's claim for disability 
compensation under the workers' compensation system, the key issue 
is the medical causes of his depression. Consequently, the ALJ's 
preliminary determination on rj^ at point will materially affect the 
final outcome of the case.1 The Industrial Commission has reviewed 
the medical evidence in tikis matter and concludes that further 
information is required from the medical panel regarding the cause 
of Mr. Whitear's depression. In particular, the Industrial 
Commission notes that the medical panel has expressed the opinion 
that Mr. Whitear's depression does not appear to be causally 
related to the exposure and without an explanation of this finding 
by the medical panel, any final determination on the merits of Mr. 
Whitear's claim may be flawed. In the judgment of the Industrial 
Commission, this issue can be resolved most easily and efficiently 
at this point in the proceeding. 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Whitear^scj.jjji.is remanded to 
the ALJ. The ALJ is instructed to conductr^hearina on th^ ^ d-iral 
panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr. Whitear's 
depression. fThe ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and 
appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and 
extent of Mr. Whitear's depression and related disability. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission hereby grants Brown & Root's motion 
for review and remands this matter to the ALJ for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. 
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ADDENDUM 8: Judge George's December 29, 1995 FAX transmission 
re the limitation of the issues for the February 7, 1996 
Hearing 
FAX COVER SHEET 
PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET; 2 
DATE: DECEMBER 29, 19*15 




TO: FAX#: TEL#: 
SCHEFFLER. H. -521-3731 531-6600 
POELMAN. S. 521-7965 ~ 521-7900 
RE:. HAVPN WHITPAB 32222 
MESSAGE: COUNSELORS--! REVIEWED THE 03JKCTIONS TO THE 
REHAB SERVICES REPORT. & THE RESPONSE. IN SENWG THE REPORT OUT. 
MY THOUGHT WAS THAT BY GETTING IT OUT PERHAPS WE COULD BE 
ADVANCING ON BOTH TRACKS. HOWEVER. MR. POEL VIA N IS PERSUASIVE IN 
POINTING OUT THAT IT IS LOGICAL TO FIRST HAVE THE CAUSAL CONNECTION 
(if any) ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT & THE 
DEPRESSION. IF NO CONNECTION IS SHOWN. THA T WILL LIKEL Y END THE 
MA TTER. IF A CONNECTION IS SHO WN, AL THOUGH THiz DEFENDANTS CAN 
BE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP A RE-EMPlOYMENT PLAN. GET 
A CONTRASTING VOC REHAB REPORT & HAVE A HEAFIKS, A TENAW/E 
FINDING OF PTD CAN BE MADE IN THE INTERIM. SINCE t~HA T FINDING COULD 
BE MADE A T THE CONCLUSION OF THE 2/07/9$ HEARWC, ON OBJECTIONS TO 
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT. THERE IS NO HARM IN fIC "EXPANDING THE 
SCOPE OF THE HEARING TO INCLUDE OBJECTIONS TO THE REHAB SERVICES 
REPORT. MR. SCHEFFLERS REQUEST IS DENIED. HCWi:VER. IF THE HEARING 
RESULT IS FAVORABLE TO THE APPLICANT. MR. POELUANS LETTER MIGHT BE 
A START FOR A RE-REFERRAL TO STATE REHAB WITH MORE SPECIFIC 
QUESTIONS? WE'LL SEE WHA T THE HEARING BRINGS. 
MR. SCHEFFLER. AS I LOOKED OVER THE FILE QLfCniY. I NOTED THAT 
THE LAST HEARING NOTICE DID NOT HA VE DR. CALI COP.'XD AS HAD BEEN 
DONE ON PRIOR SETTING NOTICES. I ASKED MS. MELE & SHE INDICATED SHE 
HAD BEEN INFORMED IT WAS YOUR RESPONSIBIUT/ TO ARRANGE FOR YOUR 
WITNESS TO BE HERE. THAT SEEMS RIGHT AS MR. CJ-U WILL NOT GET PAID 
IF YOU DON'T BRING HIM. a ' 
THANK YOU GENTLEMEN!***' 
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING 
I certify that I have mailed the attached FAX to the fc'.'owsng by first class 
prepaid postage on the day of DECEMBER, 1935: 
HAVEN WHITEAR, ROUTE 2, BOX 131, MORGAN, UT C4CS0 
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ADDENDUM 9: Hearing transcript pages cited in Mr. Whitear's Brief 




BROWN & ROOT," INC.; * " 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE and 










• '\ x : ~:.:d?: Defendants . ^ -;^ C:.) 
Case No.' 93229 
Deposition of: 
HEARING ON ORDER OF 
REMAND TO OBJECTIONS OF 
-THE--ME D I.C AL-RERORT 
* * * 
CERTIFIED COPY 
. -** -s^r..-*. • 7->"*-' 
'-' I " ^ J J ' B V I T REMEMBERED' t h a t on t h e 7 t h day o f
 :*f 
?:.:-mm m , m m m * • - . ; - ;
 ( 8 0 1 ) 322-3742"^v-^iS 
- R E P O R T E R S -
.
 vv,^..,,.. .. :-^;:;4.rj 
185 South State Street #380 ' v / ' f ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
UTAH'S MOST CttTIFIED ttPQlTliS FIXM 
93229. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: That sounds right, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: That ultimately led to a 
hearing, and on or about March 1st of 1994 Judge Alle 
did refer the claim to the medical panel, and the 
reason it was referred to a medical panel is obvious. 
There was conflict in the medical evidence that was 
presented to Judge Allen at the hearing. Neither 
party objected to the referral of the claim to the 
panel. 
The medical panel report at issue is dated 
May 24, 1994. I, on Mr. Whitear's behalf, filed a 
timely objection to that report. The defense never 
filed an objection to the medical panel report, nor 
did they seek an extension of time to file an 
objection to the medical panel report. 
The objection that we had to the medical 
panel report was very limited, and it was limited to 
this issue, and that is, what is the cause of 
Mr. Whitear's depression? The independent medical 
report of Dr. McCann, the reports of Dr. Cali, and 
even the medical panel all agree that Mr. Whitear is 
suffering from depression, so whether or not he has 
12 
depression is a nonissue. He has it. The issue and 
what we objected to was the causation. 
The hearing which was scheduled — and there 
was a communication problem of some sort when 
Mr. Poelman had his health problems — didn't occur. 
Subsequent to the hearing on March 17, 1995, I 
consulted with Mr. Whitear, and in an effort to move 
this case along, because it is so old, I withdrew our 
request for hearing. 
Again, Mr. Poelman did not object to my 
withdrawing of that request. I reserved the issue, 
and that is the causation of the depression, but I 
withdrew the request for hearing and asked Judge Allen 
to enter an order based upon the medical evidence that 
was before him; again, Dr. McCann's reports, Dr. 
Cali's records, the medical panel reports, and all the 
other medical records from the International Jewish 
Center, all of the records that were submitted in the 
original evidentiary hearing. 
On April 20th, over a month — 1995, over a 
month after I withdrew my request for a hearing, Judge 
Allen entered his interim order making a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability and referring 




It wasn't until May 9, 1995 — keep in mind 
I withdrew my request for hearing in March. It wasn't 
until May 9 of 1995 that Mr. Poelman filed an 
objection to Judge Allen's report, and that objection 
basically outlined what he's saying here today. Gee, 
we want to question the doctors. We're entitled to do 
that. There's a conflict. There may or may not be a 
conflict, and he may be entitled to, but he has waived 
any time, to do that. 
And it is interesting to note, one of the 
objections stated is that they lost the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witnesses, specifically, I believe, 
Dr. Cali, that if they can't cross-examine, they want 
time to take his deposition. 
Well, defense counsel had scheduled Dr. 
Cali's deposition in August of 1993, and it was 
defense counsel who cancelled the deposition. It 
wasn't us. It wasn't Dr. Cali. It was defense 
counsel, and now they come back years later and say, 
"Gee, we can't question him.w 
For all of those reasons, I believe that 
this hearing should not be held, that you should in 
essence reinstate Judge Allen's interim order and 
proceed on that basis. 
Now, I don't want to go forward -- I mean, 
14 
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excuse me. I do want to go forward. I want to 
reserve my objections, but I have witnesses here 
today, and I want to put the evidence on so that if 
there is a subsequent motion .for review or an appeal 
that I don't want to have to come back and have 
another hearing and bring these witnesses in again. 
Quite frankly, Mr. Whitear can't afford to 
keep paying Dr. Cali, who is very cooperative and 
reasonable, but nonetheless — and he's entitled to be 
paid. He's taken time out of his day, so I do want to 
go forward today, but I do want to make sure that my 
objections to this whole hearing and the reasons for 
my objections are on the record. 
I'd like to make one correction to the 
representation Mr. Poelman made. Mr. Whitear is 
getting Social Security disability benefits. The 
Social Security Administration has found him to be 
totally disabled as of December 29, 1989, and the 
primary diagnosis for that disability is asthma, not 
depression, unlike Mr. Poelman represented to you. 
MR. POELMAN: Your Honor, I think Counsel's 
statement does refresh my recollection with respect to 
the Social Security findings. I think you'll find 
that the actual documentary basis for the disability 
was based on the schedules of disability under Social 
15 
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Security, and they all related to the depression. 
They did not relate to the asthma, and there was no 
record in the file that noted — and you'll have to 
look at the full Social Security file on that, I 
think. And is that in the record? I think it's in 
the record. 
THE COURT: It's there, but I didn't read 
it. Explain that to me again. You're correct in — 
MR. POELMAN: Right, that if you'll review 
the basis upon — in the Social Security file, the 
basis upon which disability was determined, this is an 
itemization of factors and so forth that they look to, 
and they have to find at least, I think, three major 
factors in order to find their — disability and so 
forth. Those factors which were found by Social 
Security all related to the depression, and there is 
nothing in that record that supports a disability 
based on the asthma. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Surely. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: This should be in the 
record. If it's not, I'll offer it now. (Inaudible) 
also indicates this is a pre-1988 case, so 
technically, we don't have to meet the standards and 




























conclusions you came to in your medical panel report? 
A No. I read over them two or three times. 
This worries me to come to court, and I have no reason 
to change my mind. 
Q So it is your opinion, I take it, that 
whatever depression, though it may be slight, was not 
caused by the exposure at his workplace? 
A That's correct. 
MR. POELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I hand 
the witness for cross-examination. 
THE COURT: Mr. Scheffler? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHEFFLER: 
Q Dr. Burgoyne, will you concede that an 
individual who suffers an injury on the job, besides 
the physical injury, that that may also cause 
depression? 









However, in this case you concluded it 




























contributes to the continuing depression. Now what? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: So then can we not say that 
then the incident, the accident, then is a factor, if 
that's true? 
THE COURT: Well, then ask that question. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Okay. 
Q You understand that? 
A Okay. Ask the question. 
Q Your statement that the ongoing legal 
dispute between Mr. Whitear and his former employer, 
the insurance company, is a factor in his depression; 
is that right? 
A It's a factor. 
Q Okay. So if that is a factor, then is it 
not true to say that the accident then in some way is 
also a factor in causing his depression? 
A I would have to say yes, but — well, there 
are many things in life. Yes. 
Q Thank you. Another factor that you talked 
about with Mr. Poelman is the loss of physical 
ability. Mr. Whitear, I think you said, told you how 
fast he could run. 
A Yes. 
Q And you and I are in agreement that rodeo is 
a physically demanding — 
50 
MR. BOORMAN: Your Honor, it appears to me 
that Judge Allen attributed the disability to the 
depression, and the motion for review dealt with that 
as the disability. And the motion to remand was — is 
clearly limited to whether or not the depression was 
caused by the industrial exposure, 
THE COURT: Yeah. I understand your 
objection, and while I appreciate that, and 
fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, the 
Industrial Commission isn't here to guide me, so I'll 
just have to wing it on my own. Your objection is 
overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Scheffler) During your high school 
years, how would you characterize or how would you 
describe Mr. Whitear's behavior in terms of — did you 
at any time notice signs, what you would perceive as 
signs of depression? 
A I never saw anything that I would interpret 
as depression. 
Q How would you describe his -- during those 
years, his personality? Would you describe that for 
us? 
A I think he was a jovial, personable 




Q Are you aware of the accident that occurred 
on Haven's job when he was exposed to the chemicals? 
A I know very little about the accident. 
Q Have you had an opportunity to be with Haven 
after this accident? 
A Not much. Haven and I used to spend more 
time together. He used to initiate those times 
together periodically. He doesn't call any more. 
Q Let me ask you, in the times that you have 
been together since the accident which occurred in 
February of 1987, have you noticed a change in Haven's 
personality or behavior? 
A Yes. I think there's a notable change. 
Q And can you describe what you have observed 
in terms of a change? 
A I think he's withdrawn. He's angry, and 
he's, I think, depressed. And anhedonia would be a 
good way to describe it, as was used earlier today. 
Q Was Haven angry before this accident? 
MR. P0ELMAN: Well, I'm going to — well, go 
ahead. 
A I don't think he had directed, continual, 
frustrated anger before this accident. 
Q Okay. How about withdrawn? Was he 









Did you — 



























• during the time that you've known 
an occasion to work with him? 
a lot together, yes. 
in Wyoming building an oil 
We worked on his dairy. 
Give some dates along with 
Okay. When did you work in Wyoming? 
I think that would have been '83 or '84. 
Okay. 
We worked 





a lot on the farm much earlier 
.e 70's. 
of work did you do on the farm? 
repair fences, milk cows, move 
.tever was necessary, mostly 
Did you ever observe Haven having any 
doing any 
No. Haver 
of those farm chores? 
t could do them better than anyone 
MR. SCHEFFLER: At this point I don't have 
er questions. 




















POELMAN: I don't have 
COURT: Thank you. You 
the hall, please. 
WITNESS: Am I free to 
SCHEFFLER: Sure. 
POELMAN: No objection. 
COURT: You're excused. 
please. 
CRAIG WHITEAR, 
a witness on behalf of the 
sworn, was examined and testifie 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 












Would you please state your 
Crai .g Whitear. 
What's your relationship to 
I'm 
How 
his older brother, 
much older? 
Seven years. 
Where do you live right now 
I live on the family farm, 
Peterson, Morgan County. 
























Q Where does he live? 
A He lives in the basement of my dad's house, 
if you can call it living. 
Q Is that also in Morgan? 
A Yes. That's one block from my house. 
Q Mr. Whitear, have you been here all day? 
A Since 15 after eight. 
Q And you have heard the testimony of Dr. 
Burgoyne, Dr. McCann? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Is that a yes? 
A Yes. 
Q Trying to record everything, so I want to 
make sure it's all clear. Do you recall the testimony 
first elicited by Mr. Poelman and then by myself from 
Dr. Burgoyne about a list, literally a laundry list of 
things that may cause depression? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q What I'd like you to — I would like to go 
through that list with you, and tell me about Haven. 
The first item on the list was school, specifically 
that Haven may be depressed in part because he was 
getting poor grades in high school. Did he get bad 
grades in high school? 
A They weren't A's, but he enjoyed school. He 
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enjoyed the association with his — 
MR- POELMAN: Object to the answer, not 
responsive. He's asked about the grades in high 
school. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q Okay. Tell me about what kind of student 
Haven was besides the grades he received. 
A What kind of student? 
Q Yeah. Did he like going to school? 
A He enjoyed going to school, not for the 
study aspect. 
Q Why? For what aspect did he enjoy going to 
school? 
A To associate with his friends and to have 
fun. School was a stage. 
Q Was Haven a popular student in high school? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know whether or not Haven went to — 
I'm sorry. Did Haven graduate from high school? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q From Morgan High School? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Did he graduate on time with his class? 
A No, he didn't. 




























A He graduated, if I recall, a year later. 
One of the reasons he didn't graduate — 
MR. POELMAN: I'm going to object to this on 
the grounds of lack of foundation. 
Q Were you living with Haven at the time he 
was in high school? 
A I was living in Peterson at the time. 
Q Were you aware of him going to high school? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q HOW often would you see him while he was in 
high school on average time per week? 
A I would see him come and go every day from 
school because I run the dairy on the farm, and he has 
to walk by the dairy to get to the house. 
Q And would you also communicate with Haven 
during this time period? 
A Yes, I would. I would have him help me on 
the farm. 
Q okay. Did you go to Haven's high school 
graduation? 
A NO, I didn't. 
Q DO you know i f he went t o the high s c h o o l 
g r a d u a t i o n ceremony? 
A I don' t r e c a l l . 




A Just by subtraction or addition, so it would 
have to be '77. 
Q It's your testimony that he graduated a year 
later than the rest of his class? 
A Yes. 
Q Was he held back? 
A Yes, he was. 
Q During the time that Haven was in high 
school, did you observe any signs of depression? 
A No. 
MR. POELMAN: I'm going to object to the 
question and ask the answer be stricken on the grounds 
that he's not qualified to clinically diagnose 
depression. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q Would you describe — during the years in 
high school describe for me Haven's personality. 
A It was fun. It was exciting. He enjoyed 
life, and he enjoyed being with his friends. One of 
the big reasons he went back to school is to show the 
teachers who had prejudice against him because he 
goofed off in their classes that he could do it. He 
wasn't afraid of the establishment, quote, quote. One 
of the teachers literally went into the faculty 
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meeting one day — 
MR. POELMAN: Your Honor, it's going beyond 
the question and beyond the expertise of the witness. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: This is not professional 
testimony. This is observations. 
THE COURT: Wait, wait. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Maybe he was there. 
THE COURT: Just a second. 
MR. POELMAN: Well,, there's no foundation. 
THE COURT: If we continue to allow this 
witness to go way beyond the question, we're going to 
be here until midnight. Ask him a question and get an 
answer to it and then go on. You know, he's 
volunteering lots of information about this, that, and 
the other thing. 
If you want to explore some of those things, 
then ask him a question specifically about that. I'm 
assuming that you're aware of them, but the volunteer 
statements are going to take us forever to deal with. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: We have a right to present 
our evidence. 
THE COURT: You have a right to present your 
evidence. 




THE COURT: I assume you know what the 
evidence is, and you will ask questions accordingly. 
I don't want him to volunteer. Just answer the 
question. Stop. Ask the next question. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I've asked him about high 
school, and Mr. Poelman — 
THE COURT: High school is a four year 
experience. I don't want to *go through four years of 
experience today. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Well, we may have to, with 
all due respect. If you like that or not, that 
doesn't matter. We may have to. These doctors here 
behind me have placed great weight on these supposed 
poor grades and that supposed depression, and there is 
absolutely no basis for their opinions. These are 
people who lived with Mr. Whitear, who saw him, who 
don't have to rely upon reports from other people. 
THE COURT: Mr.. Scheffler, proceed with your 
questioning. If Mr. Poelman has an objection, he'll 
voice it. I'll rule on it. We'll go on from there. 
Q Describe for me Haven's personality during 
the four years he was in high school. 
MR. POELMAN: It's been asked and answered. 






MR. SCHEFFLER: All right. 
Mr. Poelman and his doctors have made a 
1 about the supposed conflict between your 

















MR. POELMAN: Your Honor, I object to that 
on the grounds that it's referred 
It's not my doctors. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, 
Did you hear that testimony? 
Yes, I did. 
to nmy 
» I 
And I — when did your father remarry? 
He remarried in December of 1980. 
Describe for me the relationship 
with your father still. 
Yes. 
How close to your home? 
One block away. 
Describe -- and Haven lives with 
other right now? 
Yes, he does. 
Describe for me the relationship 




— I assume 
his father 
between 
I have never heard her say one mean or 
comment about any of my father's children. 
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Q I know you haven't read the records, but 
there are some notes in the records that — where 
Haven has indicated that there is some stress between 
himself and your stepmother, but you've not observed 
that. 
A If it's stress, it's not from her. 
Q Okay. Thank you. During Haven's high 
school years, did he work at all, to your knowledge? 
A He worked on the farm. 
Q Would that be for you? 
A It would be for me or for dad. At that time 
until about — until mom's death, me and my father 
worked jointly on the dairy. 
Q Okay. So during high school he would have 
worked for you and your father? 
A Correct. 
Q Can you describe the kind of work that Haven 
did on the farm during that time period? 
A Haven did everything that a farm boy is 
required to do. 
Q Which means? 
A Haul hay, milk cows, dig fence post holes, 
chase cows from morning until night. In the summer it 
would be an average of a 16 hour day. In the winter, 
before and after school. 
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Q During his high school years when he worked 
on the farm, either before or after school or in the 
summer, did he have any difficulty doing-that work? 
A No. He could stand and lift a bale, 70 
pound bale of hay, take it from the ground and throw 
it the equivalent of nine feet in the air to the top 
layer of hay. That was a contest that the brothers 
always had every hay season. 
Q Between — let me interrupt you now. 
A Between me, my brother Ron, and Haven, who 
could throw hay the highest. 
Q How about after Haven graduated from 
school? Did he ever work with you or on your father's 
farm after high school? 
A Yes, he did. He would — 
Q When -- let me slow you down. When did he 
work on the farm after high school? 
A After high school, he would work — it would 
be around mother's death. So it would be 1980, 
and 'til his accident. 
Q In 1987? 
A In 1987. He would work when he wasn't 
working somewhere else. 
Q And doing the same .kinds of jobs? 
A Same kind of — it was his joy to work my 
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hired hands into the ground. 
Q Did.you pay him when he worked for you? 
A No. -He had another1job that paid"far better 
than I could pay him, and I would ask.him — if I had 
trouble with a hay crew, I'd say, "Haven, could you 
come out and speed these guys up? I got to get the 
hay in before it rains." 
Q And would he come out and do that for you? 
A Yes, he would. 
Q Any problems doing that for you? 
A No. He enjoyed it. He loved it. His ego 
was to work a 16-year-old kid right in the ground 
until that kid couldn't pick up a bale, and then he 
would say, "When you get big enough like me, maybe 
you'll be able to handle this." 
Q Now, let me ask you, you're aware of the 
accident that occurred? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q February of '87. You weren't there. 
A I wasn't there. 
Q Have you had occasion to work with Haven 
since that accident? 
A Once. 
Q When? 


































So summer of 1987? 
Correct. j 
And where were you working? 
On the farm. 
With Haven? 
I asked Haven if he would come out and help 
















Same kind of job? j 
Same kind of job, and he was tickled to do 
And did he come out? 
He came out. 1 
Did he try to do it? 
He tried. 
What happened? 
By the time he got the tractor started, the 
the day, the dust from the hay and the 
he hadn't lifted five bales. As soon as he 
sweat, he started to cough. He became 
He couldn't breathe. He went in the house. 
down. Twenty-four hours later he got up. 
Did you ever witness anything like that 




Another factor that Dr. Burgoyne considered 
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was the death of your mother. She died in 1980? 
A Correct. 
Q How did Haven deal with that loss? 
MR. POELMAN: I'm going to object to that on 
the grounds that it's beyond the expertise of this 
witness. 
THE WITNESS: She was my mother, too. 
THE COURT: Wait just a second. 
MR. POELMAN: He's diagnosing how — 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Let me rephrase it. 
Q How did you observe Haven act after your 
mother passed away in 1980? 
A He hurt, just like I hurt. 
Q It is painful. I appreciate that, but can 
you describe for me how you observed Haven hurt — 
A The only — 
Q — when your mother passed away? 
A Okay. The only visual effect was actually 
at the funeral itself, and he was teary eyed, but he 
is -- he was no different a week later than he was a 
week before. 
Q Before her death? 
A Correct. 
Q How often do you see Haven now? 
A If I can catch him when he comes out of the 
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basement, I won't see him once a month. If I initiate 
the visit, then I'll check on him once a week, but 
he's reclusive. 
Q Let me just stop you. So you see him once a 
week maybe? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you observed the change in Haven's 
personality and behavior from the time before the 1987 
accident to after? 
A He used to come out and harass my hay crew 
because they couldn't throw hay as high as he could or 
as fast as he could. He could unload a load of hay of 
a hundred bales in four minutes. That means you put a 
bale of hay on a loader one after another every two to 
three seconds, and he could continue that until the 
load of hay was gone. 
After the accident, he was unable to do any 
of that. He no longer came out and teased and 
harassed my hay crew because -he had nothing to brag 
about. He could no longer participate. 
Q Let me — was there a change in the 
relationship from the time before the accident between 
yourself and Haven to the time after the accident? 
A It became -- I guess the word is reclusive 
or shy off. Before when I would come up to him, he 
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would — if he had time, he'd ask, "You got something 
for me to do?" Now it's hello at best. There is 
nothing for him to talk about. 
Q Have you observed any other changes? You 
mentioned the work habit and the reclusiveness. Have 
you noticed any other changes in his personality or 
behavior from the time before the accident in '87 to 
the time after the accident in 1987? 
A My best comparison would be that he looks 
like a whipped puppy. 
Q What do you mean by that? 
A Like a puppy's interested in you and comes 
up and jumps up on your leg and wants to associate 
with you. Afterward, after the continual failure of 
not being able to do the things he used to do, he used 
to go out and work — 
MR. POELMAN: Your Honor, the answer is not 
responsive. I object to it. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q Just describe what he used to do before the 
accident in 1987, what kind of activities. You've 
mentioned work. Was Haven an outgoing person? 
A Haven would work all day, and then he would 
go out and go with his friends and associate. He 
would participate with other people. He would 
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participate with my crew. He would associate with 
my — with the hired hands. 
Q Okay. 
A He would come and play with my children. 
Q How about after the accident? Does he come 
play with your kids? 
A Not like he used to. 
Q Does he come harass your crew? 
A No, not at all. 
Q Does he come and offer to work any more? 
A He can't. He doesn't. 
Q Does he go out and socialize with his 
friends the way he used to? 
A No. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I don't believe I have any 
further questions at this time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Poelman? 
MR. POELMAN: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: You indicated that Haven had 
been held back at school. What do you mean, held back 
at school? 
THE WITNESS: One of the reasons he was held 
back is because a teacher went into the faculty room. 
THE COURT: I'm not interested in the 
story. I asked you a question about, he was held 
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called as a witness on behalf of the applicant, being 






















Would you please state your name? 
Brent Bohman. 
How do you know Mr. Whitear? 
MR. POELMAN: Excuse me. I didn't get the 
THE WITNESS: Brent Bohman, B-O-H-M-A-N. 
MR. POELMAN: Thank you. 
I grew up in the summers and spent time in 
County, virtually every Christmas and Easter 
ool holidays, for most — I would say from when 
orn until after I graduated from graduate 
Where did you go to graduate school? 
Hastings College of Law. Mr. Haven Whitear 
on a dairy farm, and I spent my time when I 
Morgan County on a cattle ranch that were very 
Are they adjacent farms? 
They're not adjacent. Our lower farms are 
t in some respects, but our upper range and the 







ose in proximity. They're both in Peterson. 
Did you know Haven when he was going to high 
I have known Haven since I have earliest 
memories of being a person. 
Q 
A 
I guess the answer is yes? 
I knew Haven before he went to 
kindergarten. I knew Haven when he went to grammar 
school. 
I have : 
Q 
I knew Haven when he went to high school, and 
known Haven since then. 
Okay. 
THE COURT: Take a break for a minute. 






MR. POELMAN: Thank you. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
THE COURT: Back on the record. The purpose 
departure from the courtroom was to make both 
aware, Mr. Bohman, that you and I have had 
previously on both a professional basis, as 
occasional acquaintance-type conversations. 
THE WITNESS: That is correct. I struggled 
for a while, however, to put your name to your face. 
and eve: 
THE COURT: Okay. Having disclosed that — 
rybody seems comfortable with it. Is that 
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correct, Mr. Scheffler? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Yes, 
THE COURT: Mr. Poelman? 
MR. POELMAN: That'-s correct. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q (By Mr. Scheffler) You are a licensed 
attorney, Mr. Bohman? 
A I am. 
Q Do you still practice? 
A I do. 
Q Let's go back to the high school years when 
you knew Haven. Would you — how frequently during 
the — take an average week — would you see him 
during the high school years? 
A In the wintertime when I wasn't on a school 
vacation, I would not see him. In the summer times I 
would see him multiple times any given week. To 
explain that, Haven's family and my family all had 
brothers the same ages, and in a rural community we 
were the closest families that had kids our similar 
age, so we all associated with each other. 
Q Did you work together? 
A Yes. I would do work on the Whitear dairy, 
and Haven would do work on our ranch. We would haul 






























in hay h 
observe 
ending on who had hay down. 
We have had descriptions in 
auling, so let me just ask you 
during your high school years 





No. Haven excelled at that 
what is involved 
., did you ever 
Haven having any 
type of work. 
of physical work Haven was pretty good at. 
ed it. 
Let's go post high school. 
relationship or your association from 
school t( 
A 
D 1987, in that time period? 
Between graduating from high 
1987, Haven and I were on different pa 




school and | 
ths. I was on a 
to school and 
school, whereas Haven chose not to pursue 
that path. Haven continued -- was emp 
physical labor type of activities. He 
for a period of time in those latter y 
speak of 
Q 
loyed in more 
was a roughneck 
ears that you 
Did you during that time period have any 
contact with Haven? 
A 
maintain 
We continued to be — we con tinued to J 
our friendship, and we continued to socialize 
frequently during that time period. 
Q During that time period, how would you 
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describe Haven's personality? 
A I would describe Haven's personality from 
the high school time period, if we're post high school 
to that time period, as outgoing, energetic. I think 
he had a zest for life. He was not a lazy person. He 
was an energetic person. He was a person who did not 
shirk from physical labor but actually enjoyed it. He 
was — he had a sense of humor. 
He was a very popular person. He was 
popular with women. He was popular with other males 
his age. Haven was probably during that time period 
the most popular person in the county for his age 
group. 
Q Sure. Since 1987 — well, let me backtrack, 
Mr. Bohman. You're aware of the accident that 
occurred in February of 1987 while Mr. Whitear was at 
work? 
A I was aware of the accident after the fact. 
Q You weren't there, obviously. 
A Within that general time frame I was aware 
of the accident. He spoke to me about it. At the 
time of the accident, which I believe was around 1986, 
I was a licensed attorney in the state. 
Q You were? 
A I was. I graduated and moved here in 1984, 
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and during, I would say the first three years after 
the accident, not immediately after, but two or three 
years after, he did call me regarding that accident. 
Q Did you — let's take the time period from 
February 1987 to now. How would you characterize your 
relationship with Haven for that time period? 
A I would have to break that time period up. 
I would say between the time I moved here in 1984, 
when I was admitted to the bar here, and 1990, 1992, 
we continued, to a decreasing extent, to socialize 
together. And I would say in the last five years my 
contact with Mr. Whitear has been much more 
infrequent. 
Q Okay. Let's take the first time period that 
you outlined. How frequently would you see or 
socialize with Haven? 
A That time period I would be employed as an 
attorney, and during periods of that time I actually 
lived on my ranch, and during other periods of time I 
maintained residence here, sometimes at my brother's 
and sometimes not. I would say that it would -- it 
had decreased in the first part of the time period to 
several times a year. 
Q Did you observe during that first time 




A I observed a change in — I observed a 
change -- your time frame analysis doesn't fit exactly 
how I testify. 
Q Well, let me just ask you this. 
MR. POELMAN: Well, let him answer the 
question. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Pardon? 
MR. POELMAN: Are you going to let him 
answer the question? 
THE WITNESS: I'm happy to answer the 
question. 
Q Go ahead. 
A Postaccident through the present period, I 
have observed a marked change in Mr. Whitear from 
preaccident personality, interests, the extent of his 
outgoingness. 
Q Describe it for us. 
A I would describe the change as being --
whereas, prior to 1986 Mr. Whitear was a fairly happy 
person, a person who joked, who was outgoing, who 
would come by my house when I was there at my ranch 
and ask me to go out and have a beer or do something 
with him, to a person who became reclusive, does not 
joke like he used to, does not have the same 
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personality in any regard that he used to have, 
withdrawn. 
And my contact with him during this — and 
if you want to take — I split it from '86 to '90 
and '90 and '95. To the extent I have had contact 
with Mr. Whitear, say from '90 to present, most of 
that contact has been legal in nature, not specific to 
this case, but when he would call me with respect, for 
instance, children that he hasn't seen that he might 
want to see, and where he would express 
disillusionment with the fact that he doesn't have 
money to pursue legal actions. 
And usually those conversations would be 
where he tried to do something but didn't have the 
resources to do it, and then he would call me after 
having paid an attorney, for instance, $400 and 
have -- and not have achieved a result and call me to 
see if there is anything I could do to it. 
I am not a psychologist. " I am not a 
psychiatrist, so I couldn't opine as to his mental 
state, but I would say he was very -- from 
observations, I would say he was very withdrawn, very 
reclusive, very -- in some respects embarrassed. In 
some respects, the best word I could use for it is 
frustrated. Most of the conversations I had during 
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this period would focus on lack of resources and lack 
of money to do anything to effectuate a purposeful 
life. 
We specifically had conversations as friends 
regarding whether he could get employment and try to 
better his life, and we talked about things that 
prohibited that. He would talk about his inability to 
work on his family's farm, that he couldn't haul hay, 
that he couldn't maintain certain types of things. it 
was conversations in that nature, and they were rare. 
Frankly, they were rare. 
I have not seen much of Haven in the last 
five or six years. The last time I talked to Haven 
before this for any extent was, last year when this 
hearing was going to heppen, he called and asked if I 
would appear. And I think I've talked to him twice 
since then when he called me and asked me to appear. 
And one of those conversations had to do with the fact 
the state is seeking — the state on behalf of a woman 
who is alleged to have his child is seeking — or has 
filed a civil action. And he asked me if I could help 
him on that, and I agreed to do that. 
Q A paternity action? 
A It's a paternity action with claims for 





And I am 
the mother of the child. And 
do that, but I agreed to help 
the attorney or record on that 




MR. SCHEFFLER: I don't have 
. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. POELMAN: 










I deem my family and 
friends. 
to be a 
the Whit 
Yes. Now, what — you talked 
Haven on a paternity 
that's ongoing? 




Haven on that. 
, and so I 
Haven this 
any further 
close friend of 
ear family to 
about trying 
Is that 
— I think it was filed 
I see. And had you represent 
prior paternity suit? 
A 




I do not recollect having rep 
aternity suit. 
Did you represent him in any 
ion? 
A couple things have 
ed him in the 
resented him in 
other prior 
been mentioned here 
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Q I realize you disagree on that issue with 
him. It's just that you made a statement of sometimes 
an event happens. There is a consequence, a 
reaction. 
A All the time. That's what life's about. 
Things happen to us and we react. We learn from it. 
When we find we don't want to beat our heads against 
something any more, we do something else. A 
prosecutor may become a judge. 
Q Could that happen? 
A (Indecipherable.) 
Q So then it's your opinion that you cannot 
identify the cause of Haven's depression. Is that 
right? 
A I cannot identify specific — a single, 
specific cause for his depression. My report 
indicates that personality factors are probably 
significant, a contributor, but there are other people 
with these same kind of traits that don't develop this 
kind of depression. Again, I can't explain why Haven 
is as depressed as he is. He's profoundly depressed. 
It has persisted for a prolonged period of time, and I 
think he's got a real problem, and I'm really 




please? I mean, what portion of the record doesn't 
bear him out? If you ever make any findings, I'd like 
to have specifics on that, I'd also like to note for 
the record that at no time did you step out in the 
hallway and see him use his medication, which might 
explain why you didn't see him 
THE COURT: That may 
coughing. 
well be. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: If you want people coughing 
in your courtroom, Your Honor, 
instruct all my clients not to 
before they appear before you. 
from now on I will 
take their medications 
THE COURT: I appreciate your testimony, Mr. 
Scheffler. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: It's 
statement of fact. 
not testimony. It's a 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's give a specific and 
particular, then. Both in the medical records and in 
his representations to the doctor the specific 
statement was that his sex life is essentially shot. 
Sexual function is down. He tries to have sex, it 
gives him asthma. Okay. Thatj rs out of the medical 
panel report. I don't see a particular page number on 
it, but it's in Dr. Burgoyne's 
Now, I find that not 
circumstance. He testified as 
addendum. 
at all to be the 
well that his sex life 
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has not been very good since 2-17 of '87, the date of 
the industrial accident. Well, it's kind of 
interesting that after that point he managed to 
miraculously conceive two other children. It doesn't 
appear to me from that that his sex life is impaired, 
nor does it appear to me from that that his social 
life is impaired at all. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Let me make sure the record 
is clear. You're saying that somebody who has 
intercourse two times in the course of nine years has 
a satisfying sex life. Is that your finding, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Is that what I said? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Well, you've only identified 
two times where he could have possibly had sexual 
intercourse, and so I just want to make sure the 
record is clear that that's what your finding is. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. POELMAN: Well, Your Honor, are we in 
the posture here of debating this with you or arguing 
this with you? 
THE COURT: It appears to be. He asked for 
some specific examples, so for the record I'll point 
that out. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I want specific findings. 
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That'.s why I'm 
THE 
addition, both 
asking these things. 
COURT: And I'm giving them to you. In 
of the doctors who came on for the 
defendants have indicated that they are essentially 
very much surp 
friends, and I 
rised at the support of family and 
don't think that can be disregarded. 
By their observation or by what has transpired here 
today, there's 
and once again 
lots of people that are supporting him, 
, that runs counter to his 
representations to us here today, as well as to the 
doctors, that 
Now, 
today was to d 
depression was 
he is withdrawn. 
the purpose of this hearing basically 
eal with the remand as to whether the 
the cause or was caused by the 
industrial accident. And I finally conclude that 
that's not the 
preponderance 
that there was 
the industrial 
case at all, that there is not a 
of evidence in -support of the conclusion 
a medically caused connection between 
accident and his depression, and 
therefore, claims for perm and total disability that 





is case is dismissed on that ground. 
SCHEFFLER: Your Honor, what about the 




MR. SCHEFFLER: Payment of medical bills. I 
didn't present any evidence, since it wasn't an issue, 
as to causation, but I think there's a prior order 
from 1989 whereby the defense is required to pay all 
reasonable medical expenses related to the asthma, and 
I would — 
THE COURT: And as to the asthma I would 
agree all the medical expenses there should be paid. 
THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Poelman? 
MR. POELMAN: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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Scott W. Bean 
Chief Executive Officer 
August 18, 1995 
Honorable Judge Timothy C Allen 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East, 300 S. 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
RE: Haven Whitear 
Dear Judge Allen: 
Haven Whitear made application for services through the 
Division of Rehabilitation July 10, 1995 and we gathered 
medical information on him to determine whether or not he 
could benefit from services of our agency. 
Mr. Whitear suffers from severe asthma and his condition 
has put a lot of restrictions on him as to the types of 
work that he can and cannot do. Environmental factors 
such as fumes, dust, smoke, and vapor associated with 
some types of work exacerbate his condition. Because of 
these restrictions, it was felt that the client should 
undergo a vocational evaluation to determine his 
aptitudes and interests and to better assist him in 
finding a new career since he can no longer do the type 
of work that he had done previously because of the above 
environmental factors. 
After receiving the results of the vocational evaluation, 
Haven and I sat down and discussed his situation. It was 
felt by the client that because of the severe respiratory 
condition, including asthma and shortness of breath, 
reduction of physical capacity with reference to heavy 
lifting and carrying, weakness of extremities and being 
susceptible to environmental influences that are 
associated with most work areas to some degree, he 
probably could not benefit from Rehabilitation services 
at this point in time. 
• • « • 
Haven Whitear 
August 18, 1995 
Page two 
After evaluating this client's overall*'"situation and the 
number and severity of limitations placed upon him, I 
would have to agree with Haven that he would not be able 
to benefit from our services. It is unlikely that his 
condition will improve enough at this point to make him 
feasible for Rehabilitation Services. 
If you have questions, or require more specific 
information, please feel free to contact me at 399-9231. 
Sincerely, 
i r./r 
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ADDENDUM 12: Judge George's February 7, 1995 FAX transmission re 
drafting of the Findings of Fact 
FAX COVER SHEE1 
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HA\/r?,V \AJUtTF/lP tt-mQ RE: 
MESSA GE MR. POELMAN--ALTHOUGHI RECITED SOME SPECIFICS IN 
MY DECISION THIS EVENING, THA T WAS NOT ALL-INd.U'SIVE. YOU MA Y 
UTILIZE ALL THE SUPPORT EVIDENCED IN YOUR DEFENSE THAT YOU FEEL IS 
APPROPR'.A TE. IF I FEEL THA T SOMETHING MORE OR LESS IS NECESSARY, I'LL 
ASK FOR A DISK SO I CAN MODIFY IT. THANK YOU. * * *OL G 
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING 
I certify that I have mailed the attached FAX to the fu.'Icwing by first class 
prepaid postage on the day of EEEELLARY, 1996: 
HAVEN WH1TEAR, ROUTE2. BOX 131, MORGAN, UT 34050 
. ' j l l ^ • ic.wo nv rjt-s.iaxi h;i;o ace toe r v j hr:Tr aa.ici r-
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ADDENDUM 13: July 26, 1996 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93229 
HAVEN WHITEAR, 
Applicant, FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BROWN SL ROOT, INC. , 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE, and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
AND ORDER 
Defendants. 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah# 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
February 22, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Further hearing in Room 334, February 7, 1996 
pursuant to Order and Notice of Commission. 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
The Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law 
Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Hans 
Scheffler, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Stuart L. 
Poelman, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 





By an Application for Hearing filed with the Commission on 
April 22, 1987, Applicant sought a declaration of Defendants1 
liability for workers compensation benefits arising out of an 
accident which he claimed to have occurred on February 17, 1987 
while employed by the defendant Brown & Root at a plant site in 
Clearfield, Utah. Applicant alleged that a toxic chemical 
identified as Fyrquel 220 had spilled on him causing him injury. 
Hearing on said Application was held before Administrative Law 
Judge Timothy C. Allen on August 6, 1987, resulting in an Order 
issued by Judge Allen dated August 7, 1987, noting that the 
Defendants had accepted liability for said claimed industrial 
accident and had agreed to pay all outstanding medical expenses 
incurred by the Applicant to date. It was further noted that the 
parties would consult and agree to a mutually-acceptable 
physician to examine the Applicant further, with Brown & Root and 
Highlands Insurance (herein called "Defendants") to pay the cost 
of said examination. Thereafter, Applicant filed a Motion for 
Appointment of Physician dated April 13, 1988, seeking an order 
from the Commission appointing an out-of-state physician to 
perform the contemplated examination of Applicant. Said order 
was opposed by Defendants and resulted in the denial of said 
Motion issued by Judge Allen in his letter dated May 4, 1988. 
Thereafter, Whitear was examined by Dr. Attilio D. Renzetti at 
the University of Utah Medical Center, who issued his report 
dated July 14, 1988, noting that Applicant suffers from a 
bronchial asthma secondary to his exposure to organic phosphates, 
but that there was no evidence of either temporary or permanent 
disability as a result thereof. At various times thereafter, 
Defendants' counsel was contacted by Attorneys Virginius Dabney, 
John Preston Creer and Morris & Morris representing Applicant and 
requesting that Defendants accept liability for additional 
workers compensation benefits arising out of said accident. 




based upon the evidence which had been generated, including the 
medical report of Dr. Renzetti. 
On February 15, 1993, Attorney Hans M. Scheffler filed the 
Application for Hearing in this case on behalf of Applicant, 
asserting that Defendants are liable for unpaid medical expenses, 
permanent partial compensation, and travel expenses. Defendants 
answered this Application by denying Defendants1 liability for 
further benefits, and affirmatively alleging that Defendants1 
liability for any further medical expenses being claimed is 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in the 
Workers Compensation Act as amended in 1988. The Application was 
thereafter amended to include a claim for permanent total 
disability, which was denied by Defendants. Hearing on 
Applicant's amended Application was held on February 22, 1994 
before Judge Allen, at which time the testimony of Applicant was 
taken and documentary evidence was received. Thereafter, Judge 
Allen issued his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the 
case to a Medical Panel for its evaluation of the medical issues. 
The Medical Panel, consisting of Doctors Madison H. Thomas, 
Robert H. Burgoyne, and Kevin T. McCusker, submitted its report 
to the Commission and said report was then served upon the 
parties on September 28, 1994. Applicant objected to the Medical 
Panel report, and a hearing on said objections was set but then 
cancelled pursuant to Applicant's withdrawal of his objections. 
Judge Allen then entered an Interim Order dated April 20, 1995, 
containing a tentative finding that Applicant was permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of said industrial accident. By 
their letter dated May 19, 1995, Defendants objected to said 
Interim Order and moved for a review thereof. Pursuant to 
Defendants' motion for review, the full Commission entered its 
Order of Remand dated July 31, 1995, whereby it ordered that a 
further hearing be held on the Medical Panel report. Thereafter, 
this case was reassigned to Judge Donald L. George for further 




Rehabilitation Services, which had been ordered by Judge Allen, 
was then received by the Commission and served upon the parties 
by Judge George. Defendants objected to said rehabilitation 
report, and Applicant responded, resulting in the determination 
by Judge George that the objections of Defendants were well taken 
and that a determination of the Defendants1 liability for the 
claimed permanent total disability benefits should be made prior 
to dealing with the question of rehabilitation. A hearing on the 
remand was then scheduled and conducted on February 7, 1996, at 
which time Doctors Thomas and Burgoyne of the Medical Panel were 
present and testified, and the parties presented additional 
evidence by way of testimony and documentation. Following the 
taking of evidence at the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge 
announced his decision with respect to the issues, and requested 
that Defendants1 counsel prepare a proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order for his consideration. 
Having been fully advised in the premises, the 
Administrative Law Judge now enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On February 17, 1987, Applicant sustained injuries as a 
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment with the defendant Brown & Root, when his clothes and 
person were contaminated with a chemical identified as Fyrquel 
220. 
2. At the time of his accident, Applicant was receiving a 
wage of $8.00 per hour, which resulted in an average weekly wage 
of $340.00 per week. He was not married and had no dependent 
children at that time. His compensation rate for his said 




3 . Applicant was terminated from his employment with Brown 
& Root on March 31, 1987. 
4. Beginning January 8, 1988, Applicant applied for and 
received unemployment compensation for a period of 20 weeks. He 
then became employed by Loffland Brothers as a roughneck working 
on drilling rigs commencing May 5, 1988, which employment 
continued until his termination on December 29, 1989. He was 
rendered unable to work between July 26, 1989 and September 14, 
1989, because of a knee injury which he sustained in an 
industrial accident while working for Loffland Brothers. 
Following the termination of his employment with Loffland 
Brothers, he applied for and received unemployment compensation 
for a period of 26 weeks, extending into June 1990. 
5. Applicant applied for and received Social Security 
disability benefits commencing December 29, 1989. The Social 
Security file reveals that the award of Social Security benefits 
was made pursuant to criteria relating to Applicants depression. 
6. Applicant's own testimony lacks credibility and is 
therefore unreliable. His demeanor during the hearing on 
February 7, 1996, demonstrated his unusual hostility resulting in 
substantial exaggeration relating to many facts which he claims. 
He maintained that he was bothered by the smell of perfumes and 
colognes fla mile away", yet he did not appear to be affected by 
those substances which were present in the hearing room. He also 
made specific reference to his inability to tolerate the 
disinfectants used in restrooms, yet he registered no complaint 
toward those which were present in the restroom adjacent to the 
hearing room. He maintains that his sex life has been 
dramatically affected as a result of the industrial accident. 




fathered three children since that time. He has consistently 
claimed that he has had problems with his breathing since the 
industrial accident, but the statement of his wife, Tracy Godwin, 
which is contained in the Social Security file, represents that 
he had no trouble breathing. He has also made inconsistent 
statements to doctors who have treated and examined him over the 
years since the industrial accident. In March 1987 he told the 
doctor at the Tanner Clinic that he had smoked a pack a day for 
several years. He then represented to Dr. Butler in July 1988 
that he had recently quit smoking. In November 1988 he told Dr. 
Able that he was a non-smoker. This was during his marriage to 
Tracy Godwin, who represents in her statement that he was then 
smoking regularly but representing to his doctors that he was a 
non-smoker. In February 1991, he told Dr. Nelson that he had 
quit smoking over a year ago, and he represented to the National 
Jewish Center in Denver that he had quit smoking in February 
1989. However, in his deposition taken in August 1993, he 
admitted to having smoked within the last week. Then at the 
hearing held on February 7, 1996, when asked if he had a smoking 
history, his response was "slightly". Moreover, Dr. Madison 
Thomas testified at the hearing that the physical tests which he 
performed on the Applicant showed inconsistencies which 
demonstrated that the Applicant putting forth less than an 
appropriate amount of effort. Dr. Burgoyne also testified that 
he was bothered by the Applicant's lack of credibility. In 
addition, Dr. McCann indicated that the psychological testing 
showed that the Applicant had engaged in attempts to fake the 
results. He also noted that those tests demonstrated malingering 
on the part of Applicant. Applicant's representation that his 
physical abilities have been severely restricted since this 
accident is belied by the fact that during the years 1988 and 
1989 he was engaged in hard physical labor and worked extremely 
long hours while working on a drilling rig for Loffland Brothers. 
His representations concerning physical limitations is also 




statement given to the Social Security Administration. It is also 
noted that the Applicant is wise to the workers compensation 
system, having claimed workers compensation benefits in 
connection with several industrial accidents in the past, 
including one for which he received compensation not long before 
he ended his employment with Loffland Brothers. Applicant's 
testimony was also at odds with regard to his plans to go on a 
church mission. A letter of recommendation sent to Ricks College 
noted that he intended to go on a mission after a year of school, 
but Applicant denied that he ever told anyone of such an 
intention. The Applicant's lack of credibility not only raises 
questions concerning the testimony which he has provided at 
hearing, but also diminishes the credence to be given to self-
serving representations which he has made to his treating and 
examining doctors. 
7. This Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings of the 
Medical Panel as contained in the Medical Panel report herein, 
identified as Exhibit D-3 at the hearing conducted on February 7, 
1996. The conclusions of the Medical Panel as contained in its 
report are strongly confirmed by other medical facts and opinions 
of record herein. 
8. The industrial accident of February 17, 1987 caused 
Applicant's asthma. His asthma has resulted in a 10% whole 
person permanent partial impairment. 
9. Said asthma has not prohibited Applicant from continuing 
his employment, and is not the cause of his claimed permanent 
total disability. 
10. Applicant suffers from depression, which has prohibited 
him from working regularly during various periods of time since 
his industrial accident. However, his depression is not the 




rather the result of numerous factors which either preceded or 
were subsequent to said industrial accident. 
11. Applicant was provided with vocational rehabilitation 
training but failed to pursue it. 
12. Applicant's depression is treatable and treatment would 
likely be effective in improving his condition. However, he has 
failed to take depression medication which had been prescribed 
for him and he has otherwise failed to pursue treatment. 
13. The record is without substantial evidence that 
Applicant has himself paid medical expenses for which claim can 
be made against Defendants in this case, nor is there evidence 
that any such medical expenses are yet unpaid. The medical 
expense arising out of Applicant's evaluation at the National 
Jewish Center in Denver, Colorado was incurred on his own and at 
the instigation of his attorney, and was contrary to the order of 
Judge Allen with respect to an evaluation to be paid for by 
Defendants. The last medical expense claimed by Applicant which 
was paid by Defendants prior to the filing of the Application 
herein was the billing of Dr. Renzetti in the sum of $28.00 for 
services rendered November 28, 1989. Said expense was paid by 
Defendants on January 12, 1990. No other claimed medical 
expenses for treatment were submitted to Defendants for payment 
between January 12, 1990 and the filing of the Application herein 
on February 16, 1993. 
14. Prior to his said industrial accident, Applicant had 
sustained a 1% whole person permanent partial impairment as a 
result of surgery to his left knee. In addition, one-half of the 
5% permanent partial impairment assessed by the Medical Panel 
relating to Applicant's psychiatric problems are attributed to 




suffered from a total of 3-1/2% whole person impairment which was 
existing prior to his industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Applicant is entitled to compensation from Defendants 
for a 10% permanent partial impairment relating to his asthma 
caused by his industrial accident of February 17, 1989. 
2. The Employers Reinsurance Fund is liable to Applicant 
for permanent partial impairment compensation amounting to 3-1/2% 
of the whole person for left knee and psychological impairment 
attributed to his condition prior to the industrial accident 
herein. 
3. Applicant is entitled to recover from Defendants and 
from the Employers Reinsurance Fund interest on his awards of 
compensation herein at the statutory rate of 8% per annum from 
May 25, 1994, the date of the Medical Panel report. 
4. Applicant's attorney, Hans M. Scheffler, is entitled to 
receive an attorney's fee for his services rendered to Applicant 
in connection with this Application. Said attorney's fee should 
be deducted from the benefits due to Applicant and paid directly 
to Attorney Scheffler. 
5. Applicant's claim for additional medical expenses 
arising out of his industrial accident of February 17, 1989 is 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in 
Section 35-1-99(2) of the 1988 Utah Workers Compensation Act. 
6. Applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability 





IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Brown & Root, Inc. 
and Highlands Insurance, pay the Applicant Haven Whitear 
permanent partial disability compensation at the rate of $213.00 
per week for 31.2 weeks, for a total of $6,645.60, for the 10% 
whole person permanent partial impairment which he sustained in 
connection with his asthmatic condition caused by the industrial 
accident of February 17, 1987. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $213.00 per week 
for 11.12 weeks, for a total of $2,368.56 for the 3.5% impairment 
attributable to Applicant's impairment prior to the industrial 
accident. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund pay Applicant interest on the compensation 
awarded herein at the statutory rate of 8% per annum beginning 
May 25, 1994, the date of the Medical Panel report, and 
continuing until said compensation is paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay Hans M. Scheffler, 
attorney for Applicant, the sum of $1,802.83 plus 20% of the 
interest payable on the awards made herein for services rendered 
in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards 
to Applicant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all additional workers 
compensation benefits claimed by Applicant herein be and are 
hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any motion for review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of 




objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. 
DATED this g?(pjffiday of July, 1996. 




DONALD L. GEORGE 
Administrative Law Judge 
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ADDENDUIVI 14: December 19, 1997 Order on Motion for Review 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
HAVEN WHITEAR, * 
* ORDER ON MOTION 




BROWN & ROOT, INC., HIGHLANDS 
INSURANCE, and EMPLOYERS* * Case No. 93-0229 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
Haven Whitear asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision regarding Mr. Whitear's claim for benefits under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-80i(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Whitear presents a wide variety of procedural and substantive issues, as follows: 1) The 
propriety of The Industrial Commission of Utah's previous order remanding Mr. Whitear's claim 
to the ALJ for further proceedings; 2) Whether Mr. Whitear's work accident was a cause of his 
depression; 3) Mr. Whitear's right to permanent total disability compensation under the Act; 4) The 
credibility of Mr. Whitear's testimony; 5) The ALJ's reliance on defense counsel to draft proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law; 6) Defendant's liability for Mr. Whitear's medical expenses 
related to his asthma; and 7) Mr. Whitear's claim to additional permanent partial disability benefits 
from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. ("ERF"). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board adopts the findings of fact set forth in the decision of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For clarity, each issue raised by Mr. Whitear will be addressed separately. 
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I. PROPRIETY OF REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. Whitear contends the Industrial Commission erred in remanding Mr. Whitear's claim 
to the A U for a hearing on the medical panel's report. The Appeals Board does not agree. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") requires that hearings be conducted to 
obtain full disclosure of all relevant facts. Section 63-46b-8(l)(a), Utah Code Ann. At the time it 
issued its order of remand, the Industrial Commission was the ultimate fact finder in workers' 
compensation cases. United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980). 
Section 63-46b-12 of UAPA specifically authorized the Industrial Commission to remand "all"or any 
portion of an adjudicative proceeding" for further proceedings. Furthermore, the medical panel 
serves as an independent objective, scientific consultant to the Commission. In light of the 
Industrial Commission's determination that further explanation was necessary regarding the cause 
of Mr. Whitear's depression, the Industrial Commission's remand to obtain specific clarification 
from the medical panel was a reasonable application of its authority to obtain all relevant facts. 
II. MR. WHITEAR'S WORK ACCIDENT AS A CAUSE OF HIS DEPRESSION. 
In every workers' compensation case, it is the applicant's burden to prove that his or her 
work accident is a cause of the disability for which compensation is sought. In this case. Mr. 
Whitear has argued that his work accident was a cause of his depression. However, the Appeals 
Board agrees with the ALJ that the contrary evidence, including the expert opinions of Dr. 
Burgoyne and Dr. McCann, is more persuasive. The Appeals Board therefore concludes, as did the 
ALJ, that Mr. Whitear has failed to establish that his work accident caused his depression. 
III. MR. WHITEAR'S RIGHT TO PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION. 
Mr. Whitear contends he is entitled to permanent total disability compensation because of 
his impairment from work-related asthma. In support of this contention, Mr. Whitear points to the 
Social Security Administration's finding that he is totally disabled. However, the Social Security 
Administration's decision is not determinative on the question of Mr. Whitear's eligibility for 
workers' compensation benefits. Having reviewed the evidence on this issue, the Appeals Board 
concludes that Mr. Whitear has failed to establish that he is permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of his asthma. 
IV. MR. WHITEAR'S CREDIBILITY. 
Mr. Whitear contends the .ALJ erred in concluding he lacked credibility. The Appeals Board 
agrees with Mr. Whitear that some of the ALJ's examples of Mr. Whitear's lack of credibility are 
unpersuasive. However, other factors do undercut Mr. Whitear's credibility, such as his claim of the 
ability to smell perfume at a distance of one mile and his unpersuasive performance on psychological 
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and physical tests administered by the medical experts. Furthermore, the ALJ was in the position 
to directly observe Mr. Whitear's demeanor during the hearing. Consequently, the Appeals Board 
accepts the ALJ's conclusion regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility. More importantly, the Appeals 
Board notes that Mr. Whitear's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits does not depend on 
his personal credibility, but rather, on the reasoned opinions of the qualified medical experts who 
have examined him. 
V. PREPARATION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY COUNSEL. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on Mr. Whitear's claim, the ALJ instructed counsel for 
defendants to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions. Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ 
failed to give any guidance to defense counsel as to the content of the decision. Mr. Whitear 
therefore argues that the ALJ failed to perform his duty to decide the case. 
The record shows that at the conclusions of Mr. Whitear's hearing, the ALJ explained the 
factual and legal basis for his decision, thereby guiding defense counsel's preparation of a proposed 
decision. Obviously, the ALJ retained authority to accept, reject, or modify the proposed decision 
and it is the ALJ who ultimately is responsible for the decision's content. The Appeals Board notes 
that the decision, as issued, is consistent with the ALJ's oral decision announced at the end of the 
hearing. Furthermore, the Appeals Board has full power to correct any error contained in the ALJ's 
decision. Consequently, the Appeals Board finds no basis to reverse the ALJ's decision because of 
defense counsel's participation in the drafting process. 
VI. BROWN & ROOT'S LIABILITY FOR ASTHMA-RELATED MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
The ALJ concluded that "(applicant's claim for additional medical expenses arising out of 
his industrial accident of February 17, 198(7) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
contained in Section 35-1-99(2) of the 1988 Utah Workers' Compensation Act." At the time the ALJ 
issued his decision, the foregoing conclusion was supported by the Utah Court of Appeals* decision 
in Brown & Root . 905 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1995). However, on October 14, 1997, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the "three year provision" of §35-1-99(2) 
is not applicable to claims for medical treatment arising from accidents prior to 1988. Brown & 
Root v. Industrial Commission. Nos. 960083 and 960084, slip op. (UT October 14, 1997) 
Consequently, defendants remain liable for all medical care necessary to treat Mr. Whitear's asthma 
arising from his 1987 accident. 
VII. ADDITIONAL PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS FROM THE ERF. 
The ALJ found that Mr. Whitear suffered a combined permanent partial disability of 7% for 
impairments arising from injuries to his knees and from his depression. Based on the medical 
panel's report, the ALJ also found that one-half of this 7% disability existed prior to his work 
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accident of February 17, 1987, while the remaining one-half arose after the work accident. The ALJ 
therefore awarded permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Whitear for a whole person 
impairment of 3.5%, based on the preexisting impairment. 
Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ should have awarded permanent partial disability for the entire 
7% impairment, regardless of whether the impairment arose before or after his work accident. 
However, §35-1-69 of the Act in effect at the time of Mr. Whitear's accident authorizes the ERF to 
pay compensation only for permanent impairments that existed prior to the work accident. 
Consequently, the ALJ's order directing the ERF to pay permanent partial disability compensation 
based on Mr. Whitear's preexisting 3.5% impairment is correct. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board reverses the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Whitear's right to payment of 
medical expenses necessary to treat his work-related asthma is barred by §35-1-99(2) of the Act. 
The Appeals Board hereby orders defendants to pay the reasonable expense of such medical care. 
The Appeals Board affirms all other portions of the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / f o a y of December, 1997. 
C^&&&* /^>CC^ 
DISSENT 
I dissent from the following points of the majority decision. 
I. PROPRIETY OF REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
Although the former Industrial Commission may have had the legal right to remand Mr. 
Whitear's claim for further proceedings, I believe such authority should not have been exercised 
under the circumstances of this case. 
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At the time the Industrial Commission remanded Mr. Whitear's claim for further 
proceedings, the record contained sufficient evidence to allow the Industrial Commission to render 
a fair and reasoned decision on the issue of medical causation. The ALT assigned to the case at that 
time was correct in his conclusion that, on the central issue of medical causation, there was no 
evidence to support the medical panel's opinion that Mr. Whitear had suffered from depression prior 
to his work accident of February 17, 1987. To the contrary, the underlying evidence showed that 
Mr Whitear's depression did not appear until after the work accident, and as a result of that accident. 
Consequently I believe the Industrial Commission should not have remanded the case for further 
proceedings, but instead should have adopted the ALJ's tentative finding that Mr. Whitear was 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work-related depression. 
II. MR. WHITEAR'S WORK ACCIDENT AS A CAUSE OF HIS DEPRESSION 
As discussed in Point I. I would not have remanded Mr. Whitear's claim for a second 
hearin" Nevertheless, the testimony adduced at the second hearing also supports Mr. Whitear's 
ri<mt to benefits for his work-related depression. The opinion of Mr. Whitear's expert psychologist 
that Mr Whitear's depression was caused by his work accident was consistent with Mr. Whitear s 
actual history as described bv Mr. Whitear himself and other witnesses who had worked and 
socialized with Mr. Whitear before the accident. It was their universal observation that Mr. Whitear 
was completely free of depression prior to the accident. 
The medical panel supported its hypothesis that Mr. Whitear suffered from pre-existing 
depression based on a shopping list of theoretical causes for such depression. However, one: by-one. 
such theoretical causes were specifically refuted by witnesses with personal knowledge of the tacts. 
Bv the end of the second hearina, the foundation of the medical panel's report was undermined, 
leaving the expert opinion in support of Mr. Whitear's claim as the most credible evidence on the 
issue of causation. 
I do not lightly disregard the ALJ's determinations, but reversal of the ALJ's decision is 
warranted in this case. I believe Mr. Whitear has established a causal connection exists between his 
work accident and his depression. He has met his burden of proof and his claim should move 
forward to determine the extent of his disability. 
IV. MR. WHITEAR'S CREDIBILITY 
I a^ree with the majority's statement that the outcome of this case does not turn on Mr 
Whitear's credibility. However'. I strongly disagree with the ALJ's opinion that Mr. Whitear and 
everv witness who supported him lacked credibility. Obviously. Mr. Whitear's testimony was given 
under stressful conditions. Nevertheless, the testimony of Mr. Whitear and his witnesses was 
straight forward, based on direct personal knowledge, and internally consistent. In my view, such 
testimony was not only worthy of belief, but was essentially uncontradicted. 
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V. PREPARATION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY COUNSEL 
I do not consider it improper in every case for the ALJ to rely upon prevailing counsel to 
draft proposed findings and conclusions. However, in those cases where the ALJ makes such an 
assignment to prevailing counsel, opposing counsel should be provided the opportunity to review 
and comment on the proposed findings and conclusions before they are entered by the ALJ. Such 
a practice is followed in district courts, with good r e s u l t s . / / ^ - ,1 / I 
&* -~4 
^^trZahdGill 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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